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Brady v. Maryland' has reached a respectable age. Not as
t , ~famous "right to
venerated, perhaps, as Gideon v. W a i n ~ r i ~ hthe
counsel" case also decided that Term, Brady nonetheless occupies a
special place in the constellation of Supreme Court decisions
protecting a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.3 Brady's holding
is familiar to virtually every practitioner of criminal law: "[Tlhe
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

*

Professor of Law, Pace Law School. The author would like to thank the South
Texas Law Review for organizing the Prosecutorial Ethics Symposium and assisting in the
presentation and publication of this Article.
1. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. See Scott E . Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages: The Tale of
Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGEL. REV.643,643 (2002) (describing Brady as one of a
"handful of Warren Court cases [that] have taken on superhero status").
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upon request violates due process where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad
faith of the prosecution."4
This principle, according to the Brady Court, reflects our nation's
abiding commitment to adversarial justice and fair play toward those
persons accused of crimes.' As the Court observed: "Society wins not
only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair;
our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is
treated unfairly."6 Indeed, by explicitly commanding prosecutors to
disclose to defendants facing a criminal trial any favorable evidence
that is material to their guilt or punishment, Brady launched the
modern development of constitutional disclosure requirements.'
Reflecting on this landmark decision forty-three years later, one
is struck by the dissonance between Brady's grand expectations to
civilize U.S. criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely
unfulfilled promise. That the so-called "Brady rule" has influenced in
varying degrees the conduct of U.S. prosecutors is undoubtedly true.
More than any other rule of criminal procedure, Brady has
illuminated the prosecutor's constitutional and ethical obligations to
ensure that defendants receive fair trials, as well as warning
prosecutors of the consequences of violating the rule. Thousands of
decisions by federal and state courts have reviewed instances of
serious Brady violations, and hundreds of convictions have been
reversed because of the prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory
evidence.' Reinforcing this judicial oversight, prosecutors have been
cautioned by their peers to learn and to conscientiously follow the
constitutional requirements of Brady: and prosecutors' offices have
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Brady built its holding principally on several earlier Supreme Court and circuit
court decisions dealing with the prosecutor's use of perjured testimony, and in a few cases
with the prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence. See infra notes 3 5 4 and
accompanying text.
8. See JAMESS. LIEBMANET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM:ERRORRATESIN CAPITAL
CASES, 1973-1995, at 5 (2000) (noting that prosecutorial suppression of evidence
accounted for sixteen percent to nineteen percent of reversible errors); Hugo Adam Bedau
& Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 21, 23-24, 57 (1987) (asserting that thirty-five of 350 wrongful convictions resulted
from prosecutorial suppression of evidence); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The
Verdict Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 3 (reporting that convictions in 381
homicide cases nationwide have been reversed because prosecutors concealed evidence
proving the defendant's innocence or presented evidence they knew to be false).
9. See NAT'L COLL. OF DIST. AlTORNEYS, DOING JUSTICE:A PROSECUTOR'S
GUIDE TO ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITY36 (Ronald H. Clark ed., 2002) (stating that "a
4.
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formulated guidelines to foster compliance with the requirements of
~ r a d ~ Finally,
."
and more explicitly than any other constitutional
procedural guarantee, Brady's due process standard has been
incorporated into an explicit ethical duty upon government
attorneys."
Nevertheless, despite reversals, guidelines, ethical oversight, and
hortatory appeals to prosecutors to seek justice, Brady's promise of
transforming criminal trials from a "sporting" theory of litigation into
a genuine search for the truth has largely been unkept. Indeed, by
exposing the seamy, secretive, and cavalier disregard by prosecutors
of the rights of criminal defendants, Brady has engendered
widespread cynicism about the capacity of prosecutors to comply with
their constitutional and ethical obligations, as well as the willingness
of courts and disciplinary agencies to hold prosecutors accountable for
their derelictions. Brady, one may correctly conclude, is "[m]ore
honored in the breach than the observance.""
Brady has failed as a discovery doctrine.13 Brady is insufficiently
enforced when violations are discovered, and virtually unenforceable
when violations are hidden. Because Brady applies to evidence known
only to the prosecutor and unknown to the defense, disclosure of this
evidence depends almost exclusively on the diligence, integrity, and
good faith of the prosecutor. If the prosecutor chooses to conceal
prosecutor's Brady duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant is an
important component of the prosecution function and every prosecutor should undertake
t o know and conscientiously follow the prosecutor's duties under Brady").
10. See, e.g., LOS ANGELES COUNTY DIST. AlTORNEY'S OFFICE, SPECIAL
DIRECTIVE
02-08, BRADYPROTOCOL
(2002), available at http://da.co.la.ca.us/sd02-08.htm
(establishing the "Brady Compliance Division" t o coordinate and make available known
Brady information, including preparation and completion of "Brady Forms" describing the
search required to be conducted by law enforcement personnel to determine the existence
of Brady material); see also Steve Weinberg, Breaking the Rules: Who Suffers When a
Prosecutor is Cited for Misconduct, THE CENTERFOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, June 26,2003,
http://www.publicintegrity.or~pmldefault.aspx?sid=main
(describing San Diego County
District Attorney's implementation of a training program and comprehensive manual to
enforce Brady obligations).
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2004); MODEL CODEOF
PROF'LRESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (2004); ABA STANDARDSRELATINGTO THE
ADMIN.OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 3-3.11(a) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
STANDARDS,
RULES& REGULATIONS
1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed.,
West Group 2001).
THE TRAGEDY
OF HAMLET
PRINCE OF DENMARK
act
12. WILLIAMSHAKESPEARE,
1, sc. 4.
13. See Sundby, supra note 3, at 645 (noting that "if we do not expressly recognize
Brady's limitations as a discovery doctrine, we may erroneously be tempted to dismiss or
downplay complaints that discovery rules are inadequate because of a misguided belief
that Brady ultimately will ensure that nothing important slips through").
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exculpatory evidence, the evidence usually will remain hidden until
long after the defendant is convicted, and in fact may never be
discovered.14The extent to which prosecutors fail to discharge their
Brady obligations therefore is almost impossible to measure
accurately.
Nevertheless, by extrapolating from judicial decisions, disclosures
by the media, and anecdotal evidence, it is readily apparent that
Brady violations are among the most pervasive and recurring types of
prosecutorial violations. Indeed, Brady may be the paradigmatic
example of prosecutorial misconduct. Numerous studies have
documented widespread and egregious Brady violation^.'^ Many of
these violations have occurred in the same prosecutors' office,16 and
appear to have occurred disproportionately in capital cases." And
most tragically, Brady violations have not infrequently contributed to
the convictions of innocent persons who, because of the prosecutor's
suppression, lacked critical evidence to prove their innocence.''
14. United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1310 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[Wle are left with
the nagging concern that material favorable to the defense may never emerge from secret
government files."), vacated sub nom. United States v. Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985)
(mem.).
15. See sources cited supra note 8.
16. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDCIDCSL L. REV. 275, 2 8 1 4 2 (2004) (noting seventy-two
reported cases of prosecutorial misconduct from the Bronx District Attorney's office
between 1975-1996, eighteen of which involved reversals of convictions based on
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence); see also Weinberg, supra note 10. The
Center for Public Integrity analyzed post-1970 cases involving prosecutorial misconduct
and found that, in many instances, misconduct occurred in the same office and often by the
same prosecutor. Id.
17. Most of the post-Brady decisions by the United States Supreme Court addressing
the nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence occurred in capital cases. See infra notes 214-19
and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1466 (11th Cir. 1986); Carter v.
Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533, 548 (D.N.J. 1985), affd in part, 826 F.2d 1299 (3d Cir. 1987);
People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977, 984 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); People v. Jackson, 538
N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); Pierce v. State, 786 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1990); Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281,291 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). These cases are
almost certainly only a tiny fraction of the total number of cases in which defendants have
been falsely convicted due in large part t o a prosecutor's misconduct, especially
misconduct involving the willful suppression of exculpatory evidence or subornation of
perjury. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 172-82 (Doubleday 2000)
(recounting several cases in which a prosecutor's misconduct resulted in the conviction and
incarceration of an innocent person); Samuel R. Gross et a]., Exonerations in the United
States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524, 533-34, 539 (2005)
(locating 340 exonerations from 1989-2003, not counting hundreds of additional
exonerated defendants in Tulia and Ramparts scandals and other mass exonerations of
more than seventy convicted childcare sex abuse defendants); see also Daniel S. Medwed,
The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L.
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Abetting the prosecutor's misconduct is the failure of the
judiciary to adequately enforce Brady's constitutional command and
thereby protect a defendant's right to due process. Even in those
infrequent instances when a prosecutor's suppression of evidence is
discovered, the judiciary's enforcement of Brady has been
inconsistent, confusing, and increasingly deferential to the
prosecutor's discretion. Whereas the courts continue to recognize and
articulate the broad components of the Brady rule, the so-called
"rule" has undergone considerable judicial alteration over the years so
that its original formulation is largely unrecognizable. To be sure, a
few of these changes have added modest increments that theoretically
benefit criminal defendants, such as abolishing the need for a
defendant to make a specific request for "Brady" evidencelg and
applying Brady's coverage equally to exculpatory and impeachment
evidence."
However, as courts and commentators consistently have
recognized, the most far-reaching modification of Brady has been the
judiciary's interpretation of the concept of "materiality," and the
resulting prosecutorial "game~manship."~'Whereas Brady used the
term "materiality" prospectively to identify evidence that a prosecutor
is required to disclose to a defendant to protect his right to a fair
trial:
the judiciary's current approach defines materiality
retrospectively to identify evidence that a prosecutor should have
disclosed to the defendant, and whether the prosecutor's
nondisclosure was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair
trial.= The most pernicious consequence of the judiciary's radical
reconstruction of the concept of materiality has been to afford
prosecutors an extraordinarily wide berth to conceal favorable
evidence from the defense in the completely rational expectation that
REV. 125, 132-69 (2004) (analyzing institutional and political barriers deterring
prosecutors from accepting the potential legitimacy of post-conviction claims of
innocence).
19. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 105-17 and accompanying text.
21. United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298,1310 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting the "annoying
frequency [of] gamesmanship by some prosecutors" is attributable to the "prosecutor's
tendency to adopt a retrospective view of materiality"), vacated sub nom. United States v.
Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (mem.).
22. See United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132,141 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[Brady] appears to
be using the word 'material' in its evidentiary sense, i.e., evidence that has some probative
tendency to preclude a finding of guilt or lessen punishment.").
23. Id. at 140 ("[Tlhe scope of a defendant's constitutional right-is ultimately
defined retrospectively, by reference to the likely effect that the suppression of particular
evidence had on the outcome of the trial."); see infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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the suppression either will not be discovered or, if discovered, will be
found by a reviewing court to not be material.24 And given this
retrospective, ad hoc, fact-intensive, and wholly speculative factual
and doctrinal analysis required to determine the "materiality" of
suppressed evidence, it is increasingly likely that even in egregious
instances of nondisclosure, a court will find the suppression to be not
material.25Prosecutors are thereby encouraged to "play the odds," and
are almost totally insulated from meaningful judicial s~pervision.'~
24. See infra notes 147-55 and accompanying text. Compare Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1314
("What we can no longer tolerate is the prosecutor's guess before trial that the evidence
after trial will not prove t o have been material, and the consequent decision to conceal it
even from the trial court."), with Coppa, 267 F.3d at 143 ("The prosecutor, however,
cannot await the outcome and must therefore make a prediction before the trial as to how
the nondisclosure of favorable evidence will be viewed after the trial.").
That prosecutors view their disclosure obligation extremely narrowly is confirmed
by anecdotal evidence. For example, Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, when he was a United States Attorney, posed to a large audience of prosecutors a
hypothetical bank robbery in which the defendant was identified by two or three tellers
and one or two customers. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,697 (1985) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (citing Discovery in Criminal Cases, 44 F.R.D. 481, 500-01 (1968)). Another
customer was located who stated that the defendant was not the perpetrator. Id. Acc~rding
to Judge Newman, "The question I put to these prosecutors was, do you believe you
should disclose to the defense the name of the witness who, when he viewed the suspect,
said 'that is not the man?"' Id. Only two prosecutors felt they should disclose the
information. Id. "Yet I was putting to them what I thought was the easiest case-the
clearest case of disclosure of exculpatory information!" Id.
In a survey of New York State prosecutors conducted by the John Jay Legal
Clinic of Pace Law School relating to a domestic violence prosecution in which the
defendant has been charged with assault, aggravated harassment, and menacing,
prosecutors were asked whether they would disclose t o the defense statements made by a
hypothetical victim. Sixty-two questionnaires were sent out and thirty-two prosecutors
offices responded. Prosecutors were asked whether the following statements by the victim
were Brady evidence that should be disclosed:
1. "It was all my fault." Twelve prosecutors said it was Brady; twelve said it was not Brady.
2. "I instigated the whole encounter." Ten said it was Brady; thirteen said it was not Brady.
3. "I made him hit me." Twelve said it was Brady; twelve said it was not Brady.
4. "He didn't hurt me." Twenty-three said I was Brady; seven said it was not Brady.
5. "I hit him too." Fourteen said it was Brady; fourteen said it was not Brady.
6. "I exaggerated what happened." Eighteen said it was Brady; ten said it was not Brady.
7. "What's in the police report isn't true." Twenty-three said it was Brady; three said it was
not Brady.
JOHNJAY LEGAL CLINIC,DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIM STATEMENTS:BRADY OR NOT?
1-6 (2000).
25. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 702 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("The standard for disclosure
that the Court articulates today enables prosecutors to avoid disclosing obviously
exculpatory evidence while acting well within the bounds of their constitutional
obligation.").
26. See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITI'. L. REV. 393, 439
(1992) ("Thus, by avoiding any inquiry into the prosecutor's culpability, and focusing
entirely on the materiality of the evidence, the Court encourages prosecutors, even ethical
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Finally, apart from legal accountability, prosecutors are almost
never disciplined by the legal profession for Brady violations, even in
the most blatant and easily provable cases.27Of all the ethical rules
regulating courtroom conduct by prosecutors, the rule governing a
prosecutor's obligations under Brady is the most explicit provision
and the easiest to enforce.28It is therefore profoundly ironic that,
given the multitude of instances involving unambiguous and easily
provable Brady violations, the imposition of professional discipline on
prosecutors by agencies mandated to enforce ethical rules has been so
rare.29As it enters its forty-fourth year, Brady v. Maryland, more than
any of the other icons of the Warren Court era, has become a
monument to judicial and ethical impotence.
Part I of this Article describes the evolution of the Brady rule
over the past forty-three years. Part I sketches the origins of the rule
and its doctrinal developments. Part I1 closely examines Brady's
impact on constitutional criminal procedure. Part I1 suggests that
Brady's essential goal has been eroded by the courts, subverted by
prosecutors, and ignored by disciplinary bodies. Part 111 proposes that
only through expanding a defendant's right to discovery can the goal
of Brady be realized. The Article concludes that Brady, more than any

prosecutors, to withhold evidence.").
27. See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady
Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987); Armstrong & Possley, supra
note 8, at 3.
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 3.8(d) (2004); MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (2004); A B A STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMIN.
OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 3-3.11(a) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
STANDARDS,RULES& REGULATIONS1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., West Group 2001).
The prosecutor's ethical duty is broader than her constitutional duty. See Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419,437 (1995) (constitutional rule requires less than the ethical rule). Under the
constitutional rule, a prosecutor is required to disclose only evidence that is materially
favorable to the defense, whereas the ethical rules require the prosecutor to disclose all
evidence or information that tends t o "negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense." Compare id. (describing the constitutional duties), with MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCTR. 3.8(d) (stating the relevant ethical rule). Moreover, the ethical rule is
not limited to admissible evidence; it includes all evidence or information that is favorable
to the accused, whether or not it is admissible. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCTR.
3.8(d). Additionally, under the constitutional rule, a prosecutor can avoid a violation for
nondisclosure if the evidence is cumulative of evidence already disclosed, whereas the
ethical rule contains no such limitation. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. Finally, a defendant's
knowledge of the undisclosed evidence, or ability with reasonable diligence to acquire such
evidence, usually relieves the prosecutor of his disclosure obligation, whereas no such
limitation is contained in the ethical rule. See Lisa M. Kurcias, Note, Prosecutor's Duty to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1205, 1219-20 (2000) (arguing
against changing the ethics rules to include materiality requirement).
29. See injia notes 267-78 and accompanying text.
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other rule of constitutional criminal procedure, has been the most
fertile and widespread source of misconduct by prosecutors and, more
than any other rule of constitutional criminal procedure, has exposed
the deficiencies in the truth-serving function of the criminal trial.

Brady v. Maryland? in hindsight, is a curious decision, both
factually and legally. Brady conceded that he participated with an
accomplice in a gruesome murder, his guilt was proved
overwhelmingly; the prosecutor's failure to disclose to Brady an
isolated statement made by his accomplice was arguably inadvertent,
the statement had no bearing on Brady's guilt, and was of only
marginal relevance to his p~nishment.~'The Maryland Court of
Appeals vacated Brady's conviction, however, finding that the
prosecutor's suppression of the accomplice's statement violated due
process, but remanded the case for a new trial on the issue of
punishment only, not on the issue of
The federal question in
the Supreme Court, then, was whether the state court's decision
limiting Brady's new trial to the issue of only his sentence violated the
federal con~titution.~~
The Supreme Court affirmed the Maryland
judgment, finding that the state court's decision did not violate the
United States Constitution, but then proceeded to announce a new
rule of discovery for criminal defendants based on constitutional due
pro~ess.~
30. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
31. Id. at 84. Brady and his companion, Boblit, were found guilty of capital murder at
separate trials and sentenced to death. Id. Brady, at his trial, took the stand and admitted
that he participated in the crime, but claimed that Boblit did the actual killing. Id. Brady's
lawyer conceded in his summation that Brady was guilty of murder in the f i s t degree,
asking only that the jury return a verdict without capital punishment. Id. Prior to trial,
Brady's lawyer requested the prosecution show him Boblit's extrajudicial statements. Id.
Several statements were disclosed, but one statement in which Boblit admitted to the
actual killing, was not revealed. Id.
32. Id. at 85. The Maryland court found that Boblit's statement would have no
bearing on Brady's guilt for first degree murder under the law of accomplice liability. Id. at
88. However, Boblit's statement admitting to being the actual killer might have persuaded
the jury t o spare Brady's life. Id. at 89.
33. Id. at 85. The issue of whether the prosecutor's suppression of evidence violated
due process was neither briefed nor argued. See Brief of Petitioner at 2, Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (No. 490).
34. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86. Given the limited disposition of the appeal, the due process
discussion by the Court, in Justice White's view, "is wholly advisory." Id. at 92 (White, J.,
concurring). The dissenting opinion of Justices Harlan and Black contended that the issue
before the Court was whether the Maryland state court order granting a new trial, limited
to the issue of punishment, violated Brady's Fourteenth Amendment right to equal
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The Court's opinion is peculiar.35The Court suggested that its
decision in Brady was merely an "extension" of earlier decisions
concerning a defendant's due process right to a fair
However,
each of those decisions related principally to a prosecutor's deliberate
use of false testimony at trial to secure the defendant's conviction,
. ~only
'
one of those decisions did the
clearly not the case in ~ r a d ~ In
Court cite the prosecutor's failure to disclose favorable e~idence.~'
The Court also cited two decisions from the United States Court of
both also cited by the Maryland Court
Appeals for the Third Cir~uit,~'
of Appeals, which, according to the Supreme Court, "state the correct
constitutional rule.""0 Considered collectively, the unifying theme of
all these cases is the recognition by the Court of the central role
played by the prosecutor in ensuring that the accused receives a fair
trial.41Indeed, the Supreme Court in Brady described the prosecutor
protection. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. See United States v. Oxman, 740 F.2d 1298, 1308 (3d Cir. 1984) (characterizing
Justice Douglas's opinion for the Court as "unfortunately unanalytical"), vacated sub norn.
United States v. Plfaumer, 473 U.S. 922 (1985) (mem.).
36. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87. The leading cases cited by the Court are Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Napue v. Illinois, 360
U.S. 264 (1959); and Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (per curiam). The Court also
added citations to Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607, 607 (1960) (claiming that defendant's
guilty plea "was induced when he 'had no counsel present' and that the prosecutor willfully
suppressed the testimony of two eyewitnesses to the alleged crime which would have
exonerated the petitioner") and Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 287 (1956) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (alleging that witnesses lied to curry favor with prosecution).
37. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. The Court also introduced the words, "upon request,"
even though none of the cases cited by the Court turned on the presence or absence of a
request. Id. at 87; see also Oxman, 740 F.2d at 1309 (Justice Douglas's inclusion of the
words "upon request" suggested to prosecutors that they had no duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence in absence of a request.).
38. See Pyle, 317 U.S. at 214-16 (reviewing a claim that defendant's imprisonment
"resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his
conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence
favorable to him").
39. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 767 (3d Cir. 1955)
(finding the state failed t o disclose evidence of defendant's intoxicated condition at time of
arrest, which should have been submitted to the jury); United States ex rel. Almeida v.
Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 819-20 (3d Cir. 1952) (finding the state's failure to disclose ballistics
evidence may have been helpful to defense).
40. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86.
41. Id. at 87 (noting that "[slociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly"). The Court had previously emphasized the prosecutor's duty
at trial to avoid committing "foul blows" to win a conviction. See Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78,88 (1935) ("[Wlhile [a prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one."). In Brady, the Court for the first time articulated the prosecutor's affirmative
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not merely as the attorney for one of the parties, but as the "architect"
of the proceeding with the power to "shape a trial that bears heavily
on the defendant."" Accordingly, under Brady, when a prosecutor
fails to comply with a defendant's request for evidence that might be
relevant to proving the defendant's innocence, or mitigating the
offense or the punishment, the prosecutor violates due process if the
evidence is material to guilt or p~nishment.~'
The holding in Brady contains several components, each of which
raises difficult questions of interpretation." What constitutes
"suppression" of evidence? What constitutes "favorable" evidence?
Does the prosecutor have to be aware that she possesses Brady
evidence? Does Brady apply if the defense already knows about the
evidence? Does the evidence have to be admissible for Brady to
apply? What type of "request" by the defense satisfies the Brady
standard? Is there a distinction in Brady between suppressed evidence
that exculpates an accused and suppressed evidence that impeaches a
prosecution witness? What did the Court mean by its requirement
that the evidence must be "material either to guilt or to punishment"?
Finally, is a prosecutor's "bad faith" in deliberately suppressing
favorable and material evidence relevant? The following sections
attempt to answer these questions by identifying the components of
the Brady rule and examining how these concepts have been
interpreted by the courts since Brady.
A. "Suppression"

Although Brady did not define the meaning or scope of a
prosecutor's "suppression" of evidence, the concept has been
understood by the courts to include several distinct kinds of
nondisclosures: a prosecutor's concealment from the accused of
information or evidence that could negate guilt or reduce the crime or
p~nishment,~'
a prosecutor's knowing use of false testimony and the
failure to reveal such testimony: and a prosecutor's allowing false
testimony to remain uncorrected when the prosecutor should have
obligation not simply to avoid misconduct, but to ensure that "justice is done its citizens in
the courts." 373 U.S. at 87.
42. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
43. Id. at 87.
44. See id.
45. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 453-54 (1995); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786,
79695 (1972).
46. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,701-03 (2004); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28,3132 (1957); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,112 (1935).
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known that the testimony is false." The concept of suppression also
includes a prosecutor's failure to investigate the background of her
witness and the apparently false testimony given by her witness.@
Neither Brady nor its antecedents established a test to determine
whether a conviction based on a prosecutor's knowing use of false
testimony must be reversed as a violation of due process. The Court
subsequently stated the test to be whether "there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment
of the jury."" Relevant factors in making this assessment include the
importance of the witness," the significance of his te~timony,~'
the
strength of the government's case,52and the prosecutor's attempt to
exploit the false testimony for a tactical a d ~ a n t a g e . ~ ~
Suppression of information bearing on the falsity of testimony
typically encompasses perjured testimony by a witness. A prosecutor's
elicitation, or his failure to correct, a witness's misleading, incomplete,
or technical misstatements ordinarily is not viewed as a suppression of
evidence.54 However, a prosecutor suppresses evidence when he
devises a scheme to shield the witness from knowledge of an
agreement between the prosecutor and the witness's lawyer and
thereby allows the witness to give technically truthful, but essentially
false te~timony.'~
A prosecutor does not suppress evidence if the defendant already
knows about the existence of the evidence.56A defendant's actual or
47. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d
509,512 (N.Y. 1993).
48. N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 1109,1117 (9th Cir. 2001).
49. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); see also United States v. Gale,
314 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ("[P]rosecution's knowing use of false testimony entails a
veritable hair trigger for setting aside the conviction.").
50. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154-55; Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1062, 1064 (10th
Cir. 2001).
51. Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284,297 (2d Cir. 2002); see Fairman v. Anderson, 188
F.3d 635,646 (5th Cir. 1999).
52. See Fulford v. Maggio, 692 F.2d 354,357 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Ramos
Algarin, 584 F.2d 562,565 (1st Cir. 1978).
53. Jenkins, 294 F.3d at 295; Mitchell, 262 F.3d at 1064-66.
54. See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1395-96 (11th Cir. 1997) (reasoning
memory lapse, unintentional error, or oversight is not considered false testimony); United
States v. Payne, 940 F.2d 286,291 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting the fact that testimony challenged
by another witness or inconsistent with prior statements is not necessarily false testimony).
55. Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972,981 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); People v. Steadman,
623 N.E.2d 509,511 (N.Y. 1993); see also Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247,251 (9th Cir.
1990) (Trott, J., concurring) (characterizing the prosecutorial tactic as a "pernicious
scheme without any redeeming features"); see infra notes 248-58 and accompanying text.
56. United States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 618 (2d Cir. 1982). "Evidence is not
'suppressed' if the defendant either knew, or should have known, of the essential facts
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probable knowledge of the evidence may relieve a prosecutor of his
Brady obligation.'' Although Brady did not discuss whether a
defendant's knowledge of the evidence negates a claim of suppression,
the Court later suggested that a prosecutor does not suppress
evidence under Brady if the defendant already knew about the
undisclosed evidence.'* Nor, according to several courts, is evidence
suppressed under Brady if the defendant, with reasonable diligence,
could have learned about the e~idence.~'
However, evidence that
theoretically may be accessible to the defense does not necessarily
insulate that evidence from disclosure by the prosecutor. According to
some courts, to hold a defendant accountable for every conversation
he has ever had would constitute an undue burden,60as it would be
unfair to require a defendant to learn about the existence of all
documentary evidence bearing on his case.61
Whether the nondisclosure by a prosecutor of favorable evidence
during plea negotiations and guilty pleas constitutes suppression
The Supreme Court has held that a
under Brady is ~nclear.~'
prosecutor does not suppress evidence under Brady when he fails to
disclose, during plea negotiations, evidence that a defendant could use
at trial to impeach a government witness.63The Court has not decided
whether a prosecutor suppresses evidence when he fails to disclose to
a defendant contemplating a guilty plea the existence of exculpatory
evidence. However, several courts have held that a prosecutor
suppresses evidence when he conceals exculpatory evidence during
permitting him to take advantage of any exculpatory evidence." Id. (citations omitted). But
see Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508,1517 (10th Cu. 1995) (recognizing a prosecutor's duty
to disclose evidence independent of defendant's knowledge).
57. United States v. Bhutani, 175 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that even if
defendant has no actual knowledge of the suppressed information, Brady is not violated if
defendant, with reasonable diligence, could have obtained such evidence).
58. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (stating Brady involves "the
discovery, after trial of information which had been known to the prosecution but
unknown t o the defense").
59. Bhutani, 175 F.3d at 577.
60. Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1013 (6th Cir. 1999) ("We d o not
believe that due process stretches so far as to hold a defendant accountable for every
conversation he has ever had in his lifetime regardless of the surrounding and intervening
circumstances.").
61. United States v. Payne, 63 F.3d 1200,1209 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting the defense had
no reason to know that government witness's affidavit had been filed in court prior to her
guilty plea).
62. See Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in the Guilty Plea Process, 40
HASTINGS L.J. 957, 958 (1989) (noting that although Brady issues frequently are raised in
the plea bargaining process, the extent of a prosecutor's duty t o disclose exculpatory
evidence during plea negotiations is unclear).
63. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622,623 (2002).
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plea negotiations.64Moreover, a prosecutor may be found to have
suppressed evidence when he fails to disclose, during plea
negotiations, relevant information relating to the plea, such as the
existence of other ongoing investigations involving the defendant.65
A prosecutor also may suppress evidence under Brady when he
fails to preserve favorable evidence from loss or d e s t r ~ c t i o n . ~ ~
Otherwise, some courts have observed, the disclosure obligation could
easily be circumvented by suppression of evidence by means of
destruction rather than mere failure to disclose. Common examples of
unpreserved evidence include 911 tapes: handwritten notes of
interviews with witnesses: erased videotapes relevant to the crime,69
discarded samples used in chemical tests,70lost blood, sperm, hair, or
urine sample^,^' and unpreserved clothing worn by the defendant or
the victim.72Although Brady explicitly stated that a prosecutor's bad
faith in suppressing evidence was not a relevant c~nsideration,'~
the
failure by prosecutors or police to preserve potentially exculpatory
evidence from loss or destruction is not a due process violation unless

64. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249,255 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United
States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 495-96
(10th Cir. 1994); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 421-22 (8th Cir. 1988); see also
Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where it Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining
Context, 80 W A S HU.
. L.Q. 1, 21 (2002) (arguing that Brady's role in protecting the
innocent from wrongful conviction is just as essential in the plea bargaining context as it is
at trial); Andrew P. O'Brien, Reconcilable Differences: The Supreme Court Should Allow
the Marriage of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 78 IND. L.J. 899, 911 (2003) (obligating
prosecutors to disclose material exculpatory evidence during plea negotiations would
ensure better informed and more accurate guilty pleas). But see John G . Douglass, Fatal
Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 516
(2001) (concluding that plea bargaining "brings out the worst in Brady").
65. See United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229,1234 (9th Cir. 1980).
66. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988) (finding a due process
violation only if a defendant can show that failure to preserve the evidence was in bad
faith); see also Illinois v. Fisher, 540 U.S. 544, 545 (2004) (per curiam). State courts need
not apply Youngblood's bad faith test. See State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 589 (Conn.
1995); People v. Newberry, 638 NiE.2d 1196, 1199 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), a r d , 652 N.E.2d
288 (111.1995).
67. People v. Brock, 740 N.Y.S.2d 54,55 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
68. United States v. Riley, 189 F.3d 802,804-05 (9th Cir. 1999).
69. United States v. Parker, 72 F.3d 1444,1451 (10th Cir. 1995).
70. California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,482-83 (1984).
71. United States v. Boswell, 270 F.3d 1200, 1206 (8th Cir. 2001); Virgin Islands v.
Testamark, 570 F.2d 1162, 1167 (3d Cir. 1978); People v. Allgood, 517 N.E.2d 1316, 1317
(N.Y. 1987); Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886,894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc).
72. State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (Haw. 1990); People v. Walker, 628 N.E.2d
971,973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
73. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963).
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the defendant can establish the government's bad faith."
Finally, suppressed evidence may also include evidence disclosed
by the prosecutor too late for effective use by the defendant at
Brady did not address the issue of when a prosecutor is required to
disclose favorable evidence, nor has the Supreme Court since Brady
answered that question. Whereas a demand for Brady evidence
ordinarily is made prior to trial, the prosecutor's disclosure duty does
The settled rule seems to
not necessarily require pretrial discl~sure.~~
be that Brady evidence must be disclosed in time for its effective use
at
or at a plea proceeding.78The ethics codes similarly require
"timely disclosure," but do not explicitly require pretrial d i s c l ~ s u r e . ~ ~
Delayed disclosure ordinarily is reviewed to determine whether
the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to make effective use of
the evidence at trial.'" Courts may also review a prosecutor's untimely
disclosure to determine whether a defendant's ability to adequately
prepare for trial was impaired." Thus, to successfully claim that a
prosecutor's belated disclosure constituted a "suppression" of
evidence, a defendant must demonstrate an impaired ability to use the
evidence effectively, either in preparing for trial or at the trial itself,
and that prejudice resulted from the belated disclo~ure.~~
Defense
counsel's failure to request a continuance after belatedly receiving the
evidence would be a circumstance negating prosecutorial
suppression.83The prosecutor's good or bad faith in delaying the
disclosure also may be a relevant circ~mstance.~~
In those relatively
74. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,58 ("[Ulnless a criminal defendant can show
bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process of law.").
75. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89,100 (2d Cir. 2001).
76. United States ex rel. Lucas v. Regan, 503 F.2d 1 , 3 n.1 (2d Cir. 1974).
77. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that evidence
"must be disclosed in time for its effective use at trial").
78. United States v. Persico, 164 F.3d 796,804 (2d Cir. 1999).
79. MODELRULESOF PROF'L CONDUCTR. 3.8(d) (2004) (requiring prosecutor to
make "timely disclosure"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B)
(2004) (same); ABA STANDARDS RELATING
TO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE33.11(a) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY
STANDARDS,RULES &
REGULATIONS 1146 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., West Group 2001). (requiring prosecutor
to disclose evidence "at the earliest feasible opportunity").
80. Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602,605 (8th Cir. 1998).
81. Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89,103 (2d Cir. 2001).
82. Grant v. Alldredge, 498 F.2d 376,381 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding belated disclosure of
identification evidence impaired defense counsel's ability to uncover additional
exculpatory evidence).
83. United States v. Watson, 76 F.3d 4,8 (1st Cir. 1996).
84. See United states.^. Richman, 600 F.2d 286, 292 (1st Cir. 1979) (finding no
deliberate wrongdoing in late disclosure); see also United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d
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infrequent cases in which a defendant can demonstrate that delayed
disclosure prejudiced his ability to prepare for trial or to present his
case meaningfully and effectively, a prosecutor may be found to have
unconstitutionally suppressed e~idence.~'

B. "By the Prosecution"
In Brady, the prosecutor had actual knowledge of a statement of
Brady's accomplice that might have mitigated Brady's punishment
and failed to disclose it to the defense.86The Supreme Court did not
consider whether a due process violation required a prosecutor to
have actual knowledge of the undisclosed evidence and make a
purposeful decision to suppress the evidence. In other words, could
suppression by a prosecutor be established if the prosecutor was
ignorant of the existence of the favorable evidence? In United States v.
~ ~ u rthe
s ,Court
~ ~ framed the disclosure duty of the prosecutor as
relating to evidence "known to the prosecution but unknown to the
defense."88Thus, "knowledge" by the prosecutor appears to be the
touchstone of Bradyeg9
What are the extent and limits of a prosecutor's
knowledge? A prosecutor's knowledge reasonably extends beyond
her actual knowledge, for otherwise, the Brady rule could easily be
nullified simply by keeping the trial prosecutor ignorant of
information adverse to the government's case. Accordingly, a
prosecutor is required to disclose not only evidence he actually knows
about, but also evidence about which he "should have k n o ~ n . " ~
A prosecutor is charged with knowledge of evidence held by
government agencies investigating the case.9' However, a prosecutor
usually is not charged with knowledge of evidence in the possession of
government agencies that are neither investigative arms of the
852,858 (5th Cir. 1979) (suppressing evidence for "prophylactic purposes").
85. See Leka, 257 F.3d at 91 (holding that delayed disclosure of a key eyewitness
impaired ability of defense to effectively assimilate new evidence into existing trial strategy
and violated Brady).
86. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,84 (1963).
87. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
88. Id. at 103.
89. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 96 (1967) (White, J., concurring) ("[Alny
allegation of suppression boils down to an assessment of what the State knows at trial in
comparison to the knowledge held by the defense.").
90. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; see ako Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)
("The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government.
A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes, to the
Government.").
91. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995); Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152,
1164 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bhutani, 175 F.3d 572,577 (7th Cir. 1999).
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prosecutor nor participated in the investigation of the case.92Nor is a
prosecutor responsible for evidence possessed by investigative
agencies of other jurisdictions, even though such agencies might be
part of a joint-task-force investigating the same criminal activity.93A
prosecutor probably has an affirmative duty to acquire knowledge
about relevant aspects of his case.94For example, a prosecutor has an
affirmative duty to review personnel files of law enforcement officials
he intends to call as witnesses, particularly if the defense requests
production of the files.95A prosecutor also has an obligation to learn
about the background, criminal record, and other relevant
information of his key w i t n e ~ s e s . ~ ~

C. "OfEvidence"
Brady did not explain the meaning of the term "evidence,"
particularly whether the suppressed evidence must be admissible as a
precondition to establishing a due process violation. The Court agreed
with the Maryland state court that the accomplice's undisclosed
confession could not have affected the verdict of guilt because it was
legally irrelevant to the jury's determinati~n.~'
The Court also agreed
92. See United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1304 (10th Cir. 1999) (refusing to
charge federal prosecutors with the knowledge of materials in possession of a state police
department). But see Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43,57-58 (1987) (holding that a
defendant, charged with raping his thirteen-year-old daughter, was entitled to have the file
of a state agency that investigates cases of suspected child mistreatment reviewed by
prosecutor, even though prosecutor had not seen the file, did not have access to it, and
therefore did not comply with defense's request for its production).
93. Moreno-Morales v. United States, 334 F.3d 140,146-47 (1st Cir. 2003).
94. For discussions of the nature and scope of a prosecutor's duty t o seek out
evidence favorable to a defendant, see Mark D. Villaverde, Note, Structuring the
Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 1471,1529 (2003) (suggesting an affirmative duty on a prosecutor to search files of
government entities in terrorism cases for exculpatory evidence exists only if those entities
have acted in a law enforcement capacity under the prosecutor's direction and control); see
also Stanley Z . Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory Evidence in
Police Hands: Lessons From England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379, 1424-27 (2000)
(proposing amendments to the codes of ethics that would require prosecutors to more
aggressively search for exculpatory evidence in police hands); Robert Hochman, Brady v.
Maryland and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 63 U. CHI.L. REV. 1673,1676 (1996)
(suggesting that Brady imposes duties not only on prosecutors but on all state actors
involved in the investigation and prosecution).
95. See United States v. Alvarez, 86 F.3d 901,905 (9th Cir. 1996).
96. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463,479-80 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that a prosecutor
has a duty to learn of the criminal record of a star witness known to be a career criminal,
including prison records on file with correction agencies).
97. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963). The Court assumed that if the
suppressed confession had been used at the first trial, the judge's ruling that it was

Heinonline - - 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 700 2005-2006

with the Maryland state court that the accomplice's confession would
have been relevant at the sentencing stage because it could have
influenced the jury to mitigate Brady's p~nishment.~'
The Supreme
Court, since Brady, has suggested that the admissibility of suppressed
evidence may be a factor in determining whether a prosecutor
engaged in an unconstitutional nondiscl~sure.~~
Indeed, in Wood v.
Bartholomew, the Supreme Court intimated that admissibility of the
evidence is a precondition to triggering the prosecutor's disclosure
duty.lw In Wood, a polygraph test showing that a key government
witness had lied would not have been admissible at trial and,
therefore, did not constitute Brady evidence requiring dis~losure.~~'
Several courts have construed the Brady rule to require that, unless
the evidence would be admissible, it need not be disclosed.102Other
courts, by contrast, have drawn the opposite conclusion and rejected
admissibility as a precondition for determining the applicability of
Brady as long as the information could reasonably have led to
admissible evidence.'03 Nevertheless, courts may be unwilling to
speculate on the capacity of undisclosed and inadmissible evidence to
irrelevant to guilt and therefore not admissible "might have been flouted." Id. The Court,
however, was unwilling to raise this "sporting theory of justice" to the dignity of a
constitutional right. Id.
98. See id. at 88-89.
99. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1967) (stating that information
contained in suppressed police report might have been "admissible and useful"); see also
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 100 n.3 (1976) (citing United States v. Burks, 470 F.2d
432, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972)) (stating that undisclosed proof of a victim's prior criminal
record would have been admissible on the issue of self-defense).
100. 516 U.S. 1 , 8 (1995).
101. Id. at 6 (stating the result of a polygraph is inadmissible; it "is not 'evidence' at
all" and it is "mere speculation" whether it could have been used effectively for any
purpose).
102. See Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602,604 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Derr,
990 F.2d 1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Zeigler v. Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 269 (1st Cir.
1981).
103. See Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003) (stating the hearsay
statement of the victim may have led to discovery of a witnesses t o corroborate
information contained in the statement); Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169,1176-77 (9th Cir.
2001) (finding the prosecutor's notes, although not admissible, could have been used to
contradict a key medical witness and therefore nondisclosure was a Brady violation);
Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d 1177, 1183 (11th Cir. 2000) (concluding that inadmissible
witness statements could not have led defense to discovery of admissible impeachment or
exculpatory evidence); see also Gregory S. Seador, Note, A Search for the Truth or a Game
of Strategy? The Circuit Split Over the Prosecution's Obligation to Disclose Inadmissible
Exculpatory Information to the Accused, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 139, 143 (2001)
(advocating requiring a prosecutor to disclose inadmissible exculpatory information to the
court, which would then decide whether the information may lead the defense to the
discovery of admissible evidence).
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produce admissible evidence and therefore strictly require that
evidence be admi~sible.'"~
Brady did not distinguish between evidence that might directly
exculpate a defendant and evidence that might undercut the
prosecution's case by impeaching the credibility of a government
witness. In Brady, the accomplice's undisclosed admissionlo5 was
potentially exculpatory to Brady because it would have been helpful
in showing that the accomplice, not Brady, was the actual killer.
Current Supreme Court doctrine, however, makes no distinction
between exculpatory and impeaching evidence.lM Exculpatory
evidence exonerates a defendant; it relates directly or circumstantially
to a substantive issue in the case. Typical examples of exculpatory
evidence include a homicide victim's prior criminal record that
circumstantially proves self-defense,'07 an eyewitness's prior mistaken
identifi~ation,"'~
and a ballistics report showing that a weapon found
on the defendant was not the murder weapon.'" Impeaching evidence,
by contrast, typically would demonstrate that a witness is lying about
facts in the case, or is generally unworthy of belief."' Examples of
impeaching evidence include a promise of leniency made to a
government witness in exchange for his testimony,"' a witness's prior
false testimony suggesting a character for untruthf~lness,"~
and a
witness's prior inconsistent statements relating to the facts of the
case.'13 Alternatively, examples of general impeaching evidence
include a witness's prior criminal record,ll4a psychological report on a
witness's c~mpetency,"~
and promises of leniency or rewards in prior
case^."^ In addition, the extraordinary lengths to which a prosecutor
goes to curry favor with a witness may also be used to reveal an

--

-

--

104. Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695,703 (11th Cir. 1999) ("A court cannot speculate
as to what evidence the defense might have found if the information had been disclosed.").
105. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,84,88 (1963).
106. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676 (1985).
107. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,100 (1976).
108. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,44145 (1995).
109. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842,845 (4th Cir. 1964).
110. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) ("The jury's estimate of the
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence . . . .").
111. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,152-54 (1972).
112. United States v. Cuffie, 80 F.3d 514,517 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
113. Spicer v. Roxbury Corr. Inst., 194 F.3d 547,556 (4th Cir. 1999).
114. Perkins v. Le Fevre, 691 F.2d 616,619 (2d Cir. 1982).
115. State v. Hunt, 615 N.W.2d 294,300-01 (Minn. 2000).
116. United States v. Masri, 547 F.2d 932, 937 (5th Cir. 1977).
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impeaching bias.l17

D. "Favorable to an Accused"
Under Brady, a prosecutor is obligated to disclose evidence that
is "favorable" to the defendant."' Although Brady did not define the
meaning of favorable evidence, both the Maryland appeals court and
the Supreme Court agreed that the extra-judicial statement of the
accomplice, by identifying himself as the actual killer, would have
been favorable to Brady at ~entencing."~Courts have understood
Brady to require a prosecutor to divulge all evidence that could
reasonably be considered favorable--or "helpful 9,120- to a defendant,
meaning evidence that has some relevance to an issue in the case and
could reasonably assist a defendant in preparing and presenting his
case.'" Examples of favorable evidence are forensic reports that
discredit key prosecution the~ries,'~'a memorandum from the Drug
Enforcement Agency undermining the government's principal
witness's integrity,'= polygraph reports casting doubt on the veracity
of a key prosecution witness,lZ4and a physician's report of an
examination of an alleged rape victim disclosing no evidence of sexual
interc~urse.'~~
Some courts have given the concept of favorable evidence a much
more limited interpretation. For example, undisclosed evidence that
an accomplice was actually an undercover agent for the government
was held not favorable;lZ6and undisclosed evidence that a key
prosecution witness had recently died also was held not to be
favorable to the accused.127According to this restrictive view, only
when there is a ccsubstantial basis" for claiming that evidence is

117. See United States v. Burnside, 824 F. Supp. 1215,1265-66 (N.D. 111.1993).
118. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963).
119. Id. at 8 M 9 .
120. See Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,10142 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
121. See Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs
Problems of Prosecutorial Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM
L. REV. 391,
394-95 (1984) (noting that since a prosecutor is "an understandably biased party," it is a
"nearly impossible task" for a prosecutor to determine objectively what evidence is
favorable to a defendant).
122. People v. Pilotti, 511 N.Y.S.2d 248,253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
123. United States v. Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452,1458 (9th Cir. 1992).
124. Carter v. Rafferty, 621 F. Supp. 533,548 (D.N.J. 1985).
125. United States v. Poole, 379 F.2d 645,647-48 (7th Cu. 1967).
126. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1977); People v. Jenkins, 360
N.E.2d 1288,1289-90 (N.Y. 1977).
127. People v. Jones, 375 N.E.2d 41,42 (N.Y. 1978).
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favorable must the evidence be dis~losed.'~~
Moreover, courts
generally accord the prosecutor broad discretion in deciding whether
evidence is favorable under Brady.lZ9
Courts often find that evidence that is not clearly favorable need
not be disclosed. For example, a ballistics report that no latent prints
of value could be found on a murder weapon was held to be neutral
evidence and not required to be discl~sed.'~~
Evidence that an
eyewitness could not state whether the defendant was one of the
masked perpetrators was also neutral and not required to be
disc10sed.l~~
A prosecutor's failure to disclose the names of witnesses
who saw nothing was "empty" rather than exculpatory evidence.'"
Nevertheless, some "neutral" evidence may be so manifestly favorable
that it must be disclosed. For example, scientific tests that fail to
connect a defendant with items of clothing allegedly worn by the
murderer are favorable evidence in that they point to a number of
factors that could have linked the defendant to the crime and did
not.133
E. "Upon Request"

One of the elements of the holding in Brady was the need for a
focused request by the defense for favorable evidence.'" The
importance of such a request was underscored in subsequent Supreme
Court decision^.'^^ In United States v. A g ~ r s , 'the
~ ~ Supreme Court
established a two-tiered framework for determining the materiality of
undisclosed evidence which depended on whether the defendant
made a specific request for evidence, simply made a general request
for "all Brady material," or made no request at a11.13' As Agurs
cautioned, the prosecutor's failure to respond to a specific and
128. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,106 (1976); People v. Consolazio, 354 N.E.2d
801,80445 (N.Y. 1976).
129. See People v. Fein, 219 N.E.2d 274,280 (N.Y. 1966).
130. People v. Penland, 381 N.E.2d 840,843 (111. App. Ct. 1978).
131. United States v. Rhodes, 569 F.2d 384,387-88 (5th Cir. 1978).
132. Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 364 N.E.2d 1260,1263-64 (Mass. 1977).
133. Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472,478-79 (4th Cir. 1974).
134. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963); see United States v. Oxman, 740
F.2d 1298, 1308 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating the Court introduced the request requirement "for
no reason discernible in the opinion"), vacated sub nom. United States v. Plfaumer, 473
U.S. 922 (1985) (mem.).
135. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S.
786,794-95 (1972).
136. 427 U.S. at 97.
137. See id. at 104-06.
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relevant request "is seldom, if ever, excusable."'38 Thus, the Court
imposed on a defendant who made a "specific request" for evidence
an easier burden to establish prejudice.'39 Under Agurs, suppressed
evidence that was specifically requested was material if it "might have
affected the outcome of the trial";14"whereas suppressed evidence that
was not specifically requested was material only if it "create[d] a
The rationale for this
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise e~ist."'~'
dual standard appears to be that, by failing to acknowledge a specific
request, the prosecutor engages in active deception by misleading the
defense into abandoning potential trial ~trategies.'~~
The distinction between specific requests, general requests, and
no requests produced considerable confusion and uncertainty in the
lower courts, and was eliminated by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Bagley, which established a unitary standard of materiality

138. Id. at 106 ("[Ilf the subject matter of such a request is material, or indeed if a
substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable to require the prosecutor t o
respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial
judge.").
139. See id.
140. Id. at 104.
141. Id. at 112. The Court observed that the proper standard for suppressed evidence
that was unrequested "must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of
guilt." Id. The Court also observed that in order to satisfy his due process duty under
Brady, a prosecutor must make an accurate prediction about the significance of an item of
evidence under a standard that is "inevitably imprecise." Id. at 108. The Court noted that
under a "sporting theory of justice," which Brady expressly rejected, a prosecutor might be
required to disclose his entire file as a matter of routine practice since any item of evidence
might conceivably be relevant on the issue of guilt. Id. However, the Court cautioned that
"the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Id. For a
discussion of the complex moral and legal judgments attending the prosecutor's exercise of
discretion generally, see Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J . LEGAL
ETHICS259 (2001).
142. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 683 (1985) (There is a "significant
likelihood that the prosecutor's response to respondent's discovery motion misleadingly
induced defense counsel to believe that [the two government witnesses] could not be
impeached."); see also People v. Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d 915, 920 (N.Y. 1990) (invoking the
state constitution to impose a higher standard on prosecutors in cases where a defendant
makes a specific request, because suppression "is more serious in the face of a specific
request in its potential to undermine the fairness of the trial"); Barbara Allen Babcock,
Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN.
L. REV.1133,1149-50 (1982) ("First, a prosecutor's failure to respond to a specific request
has the feel of misdealing. Second, the failure may lead the defense to believe such
evidence does not exist.") (footnote omitted); Paul G. Nofer, Note, Specific Requests and
the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Evidence: The Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986
DUKEL.J. 892, 892 (1986) (Agurs imposed a lesser burden on the defendant to establish
materiality in the specific request context because such conduct by the prosecutor "is
fundamentally unfair and amounts to prosecutorial misdealing.").
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for suppressed evidence.143Bagley held that suppressed evidence is
material if there exists a "reasonable probability that, had evidence
been disclosed.. . the result of the proceeding would have been
different."'4 Although this unitary test of materiality is the rule in
federal courts, states may apply a more defendant-friendly test when a
defendant makes a specific request for favorable evidence.14s
Moreover, even in the federal courts, the specificity of a defense
request may encourage the court to apply a lower threshold of
materiality in deciding whether nondisclosure violates due process.'46
F. "Material Either to Guilt or Punishment"

Brady held that a prosecutor suppressed evidence in violation of
due process when the evidence was material to guilt or punishment.14'
Brady did not articulate a standard of materiality governing a
prosecutor's nondisclosure of evidence. Indeed, Brady's use of the
term "material" appears to have been employed in an evidentiary
sense rather than as a standard of review.148After employing different
tests of materiality, depending on whether or not a defendant made a
specific request for evidence, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Bagley announced a unitary standard for federal courts in determining
whether a prosecutor's nondisclosure of evidence violates due
process.'" Suppressed evidence is material, the Court stated, only if it
could be shown that there was a "reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different."lS0 The burden of establishing a
"reasonable probability'' of a different outcome rests on the
defendant.'" Bagley's standard of materiality was refined in Kyles v.
Whitley,1s2where the Court stated: "The question is not whether the
143. 473 U.S. at 682.
144. Id.
145. See Vilardi, 555 N.E.2d at 920 ("[S]uppression, or even negligent failure to
disclose, is more serious in the face of a specific request in its potential to undermine the
fairness of the trial, and ought to be given more weight than as simply one of a number of
discretionary factors to be considered by a reviewing court.").
146. See Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239,1254-55 (10th Cir. 1999) ("[A] request for
specific information, as opposed to a general request for 'all Brady evidence,' can lower the
threshold of materiality necessary to establish a violation.").
147. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963).
148. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132,141 (2d Cir. 2001).
149. 473 U.S. at 682.
150. Id.
151. See id.; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,106 (1979) (indicating that the burden
is on the defendant).
152. 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995).
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defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair
trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of
~onfidence."'~~
Kyles also determined that an assessment of the
materiality of all the suppressed evidence should be considered
collectively, and not item by item.'" Consistent with Brady, the Court
noted that the prosecutor's bad faith in deliberately suppressing
evidence ordinarily is not relevant to a determination of materiality.'55

G. "Irrespective of the Good Faith or Bad Faith of the Prosecution"
Brady did not explain the inclusion of language in its holding that
made a prosecutor's moral culpability in suppressing favorable
evidence irrelevant for purposes of determining whether a defendant
had suffered sufficient prejudice to require a new trial."6 The Court
did note, though, that the critical consideration in reviewing a
prosecutor's nondisclosure was the "avoidance of an unfair
and not the "punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor."'58
The Court amplified this point in United States v. ~ g u r s ,noting
' ~ ~ that
a prosecutor who in good faith has overlooked evidence that is highly
probative of innocence will be presumed to have recognized its
significance and will have violated his constitutional obligation.'@'
By
the same token, as Agurs observed, no purpose would be served by
requiring a new trial when a prosecutor willfully believed he was
suppressing highly significant evidence, if, in fact, the evidence had no
probative value to the defense.16' As the Court observed in Agurs: "If
153. Id.
154. Id. at 436.
155. Id. at 437-38; see also Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 ("Nor do we believe the
constitutional obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the
prosecutor."). Nevertheless, the Court admonished prosecutors to be "prudent" and err on
the side of disclosure. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439 ("[A] prosecutor anxious about tacking
too close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence."); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108
("[Tlhe prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.").
156. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87 (1963).
157. Id.
158. Id. Bur see United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1968) (suggesting
that the standard of materiality should be lowered when prosecutors engage in deliberate
withholding of exculpatory evidence in order to "deter conduct undermining the integrity
of the judicial system").
159. 427 U.S. at 110.
160. Id.
161. Id. The Court did not discuss whether requiring a new trial for deliberate and
serious Brady violations might serve as a deterrent to future misconduct. See, e.g., United
States v. Dollar, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1332 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (dismissing charges with

Heinonline - - 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 707 2005-2006

708

SOUTH TEXASLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 47:685

the suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because
of the character of the evidence, not the character of the
111. DISSOLUTION
OF THE "BRADYRULE"

The promise of Brady v. Maryland was to make the adversary
system-and particularly the criminal trial-less like a sporting event
and more like a search for the truth.IK3However, as the Supreme
Court began to develop and refine the so-called Brady rule, it became
increasingly clear that the protections afforded by Brady for those
persons accused of crimes were largely illusory. Moreover, for
prosecutors, whose natural instincts are to discount any rule that
would require them to assist a defendant in defeating the prosecutor's
case, the Brady rule became an obstacle to be avoided or subverted.
Finally, the absence of any meaningful disciplinary sanctions against
those prosecutors who violated the Brady rule rendered the rule
virtually unenforceable as an ethical matter.

A. Erosion of Brady by the Judiciary
Brady v. Maryland presaged a revolution in criminal justice. No
longer could a prosecutor hide the truth and require the defendant to
seek it
The prosecutor was characterized by Brady as the
"architect" of the trial, and assigned the constitutional duty of
ensuring that the legal edifice of the trial was constructed solidly, with
due regard for the safety of the defendant.165Before Brady, the
architecture of the trial may have been aesthetically pleasing, but in
many ways was functionally suspect. Under Brady, the traditional
adversarial structure would be replaced by a modified design in which
the prosecutor's success would be measured not merely in terms of
prejudice as a sanction for conduct by a prosecutor that "has trampled on [defendants']
constitutional right to Brady materials"); see also United States v. Wilson, 149 F.3d 1298,
1304 (11th Cir. 1998) (imposing sanctions against a prosecutor for purposes of deterring
future misconduct).
162. Agurs, 427 U.S.at 110.
163. See William J . Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest
for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH U . L.Q. 1 , 8 (1990) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court began
the modern development of constitutional disclosure requirements with our decision in
Brady v. Maryland. . . .").
164. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668,696 (2004) ("A rule thus declaring 'prosecutor
may hide, defendant must seek,' is not tenable in a system constitutionally bound to accord
defendants due process.").
165. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,88 (1963).
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winning the competition, but winning fairly.'66
Despite its grand promise of transforming criminal discovery,
Brady received a somewhat deviant reception. In three early postBrady cases-Miller v.
Giles v. M a r y l ~ n d , 'and
~ ~ Moore v.
~ l l i n o i s ' ~ ~ - ~ r awas
d ~ either ignored, discounted, or completely
marginalized. In Miller v. Pate, an appeal from a conviction for the
brutal sexual attack and murder of an eight-year-old girl, the Supreme
Court condemned as a violation of due process both that the
prosecution "deliberately misrepresented" to the jury that the stains
on a pair of shorts worn by the defendant contained the victim's
blood, and the deliberate suppression of evidence conclusively
proving that the stains were not the victim's blood, but rather paint.'70
However, the Court cited as the basis for its reversal the same false
evidence cases that the Court used to support its Brady decision."l
Brady was neither discussed nor cited.
In Giles v. Maryland, decided the same Term as Miller v. Pate,
the Court vacated a rape conviction, finding that the prosecutor
suppressed prior statements of the State's two key witnesses that
could have substantially impaired their ~redibi1ity.l~~
The plurality
one of the precedents supporting Brady, as
cited Napue v. Zllinoi~,'~~
the sole basis for its de~isi0n.l~~
Interestingly, the plurality chose to
bypass as "unnecessary" and "inappropriate" any reference to "broad
questions whether the prosecution's constitutional duty to disclose
extends to all evidence admissible and useful to the defense, and the
degree of prejudice which must be shown to make necessary a new
Brady was not mentioned in Justice White's lengthy
concurring opinion."6 Justice Fortas's concurring opinion noted the
similarity between a prosecutor's misrepresentation of evidence, as in
Miller v. Pate, and the "deliberate withholding of important
information.. . in the exclusive possession of the State."177Justice
166. Id. at 8748.
167. 386 U.S. 1,6-7 (1967).
168. 386 U.S. 66,74 (1967).
169. 408 U.S. 786,798 (1972).
170. Miller, 386 U.S. at 6.
171. Id. at 7. For this "established principle," the Court cited Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103,10649 (1935); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269-72 (1959); Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213,215-16 (1942); and Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28,31-32 (1957) (per curiam).
172. See 386 U.S. at 74,82.
173. 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
174. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,74 (1967).
175. Id. at 73-74.
176. Id. at 81-97 (White, J., concurring).
177. Id. at 100-01 (Fortas, J., concurring). Fortas also stated, "I believe that deliberate
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Fortas observed: "A criminal trial is not a game in which the State's
function is to outwit and entrap its quarry. The State's pursuit is
justice, not a victim."'78The dissent, by contrast, expressly rejected
Justice Fortas' claim that a prosecutor has an obligation under due
process to disclose to defense counsel materially favorable evidence,
suggesting the reference in Brady v. Maryland for this principle was
dicta and "wholly advisory."179
Five years later, in Moore v. Illinois, the Court squarely
addressed for the first time Brady's application to a prosecutor who
suppressed favorable evidence that might have exonerated a
defendant."" Moore had the potential to establish Brady as a powerful
judicial weapon to ensure that prosecutors behave fairly when they
bring defendants to trial. Instead, the five-Justice majority accorded
Brady a narrow, unusually restrictive interpretation. The majority
discounted the strong exculpatory evidence that would have
substantially assisted the defendant in proving his claims of alibi and
misidentifi~ation,'~' overlooked the prosecutor's dereliction in
deceiving the defense into believing it had received the prosecutor's
entire file,'s2 and gratuitously suggested that a prosecutor had no
constitutional duty to "make a complete and detailed accounting to
the defense of all police investigatory work on a case."ls3 The four
dissenting Justices saw the case quite differently. Analyzing the
concealment and nondisclosure by the State are not to be distinguished in principle from
misrepresentation." Id. at 99; see akio Babcock, supra note 142, at 1150 ("In terms of truthseeking, there often is no difference between the jury's hearing perjury and its failing to
hear significant favorable evidence.").
178. Giles, 386 U.S. at 100.
179. Id. at 117 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
180. 408 U.S. 786,787 (1972).
181. Id. at 795-98. The prosecution represented to the court that it presented its entire
file to defense counsel and that defense counsel made no further request for disclosure. Id.
at 794. Despite this representation, the prosecutor withheld from defense counsel the
following items: (1) a statement made by one of its key witnesses that would have revealed
that the witness could not have met the defendant when he testified he met him; (2) a
statement by a witness that the defendant was not the person who committed the crime; (3)
a statement by an eyewitness that a photograph of the defendant did not resemble the
perpetrator; (4) a statement by a key witness that gave a description of the perpetrator that
was different than the defendant's appearance; and (5) a diagram of the scene of the
murder by one of the eyewitnesses that contradicted another witness's description of the
shooting. Id. at 791-93.
182. See id. at 795. The prosecutor "guaranteed defense counsel and the court that he
would supply defense counsel with statements made either to the police or to the State's
Attorney by witnesses who were called to testify at trial." Id. at 808 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Based on this representation, defense counsel's motion for discovery was
denied. Id.
183. Id. at 795.
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evidence of guilt and the exculpatory evidence that the prosecutor
willfully suppressed, the dissent forcefully demonstrated that the
concealed statements "were not merely material to the defense, they
were absolutely ~ritical."'~Moore's conclusion was inescapable:
Brady's promise of civilizing criminal discovery by ensuring fair
dealing from prosecutors was insubstantial and ephemeral.ls5
That Moore was not an aberration was underscored four years
later in the seminal case of United States v. ~ ~ u r s ,which
"~
circumscribed Brady's potential to reform criminal discovery by a
new, complex, and virtually unmanageable analytic framework. Agurs
reviewed a murder conviction in the District of Columbia during
which the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense the victim's
prior criminal record for violent assaults, evidence of which would
have supported the defendant's claim of self-defense.lS7 The
prosecution argued on appeal that it had no duty under Brady to
disclose this evidence absent a specific request from the defense.lg8
Recognizing the uncertainty in the lower courts concerning Brady's
requirement that the defense make a specific request for favorable
evidence, Agurs considered whether a prosecutor has any
constitutional duty to "volunteer exculpatory matter to the defense"
in the absence of a specific request, and if a prosecutor had such a
duty, what standard to apply.la9
Under Agurs, Brady applied to three distinct situations, and the
Court articulated three different standards of materiality that
reviewing courts should apply depending on the nature and
184. Id. at 806 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. See BOB WOODWARD& SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 224-25 (1979)
(giving an "inside the chambers" discussion of the vote in the Moore case). According to
the authors, the original vote to uphold Moore's conviction was seven to two. Id. at 224.
After Justice Harry Blackmun circulated his majority opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall
circulated his dissent, analyzing the evidence and suggesting that the conviction was a
"miscarriage of justice." Id. Justice Lewis Powell and Justice Potter Stewart quickly
switched their votes; Marshall needed one more vote to take away Blackmun's majority.
Id. at 225. Marshall was sure he could persuade Justice William Brennan to provide the
fifth vote, particularly because Brennan had announced the opinion in Brady Maryland.
Id. Marshall went to talk to Brennan and "returned shaken." Id. Although Brennan
understood that Marshall's position was correct, Brennan was trying to cultivate a good
relationship with Blackmun and if Brennan switched his vote, "Blackmun would be
personally offended." Id. Moreover, "if [Brennan] voted against Blackmun now, it might
make it more difficult to reach him in the abortion cases or even the obscenity cases." Id.
"Brennan had his priorities. His priority in this case was Harry Blackmun." Id.
186. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
187. Id. at 100-01.
188. Id. at 101.
189. Id. at 107.
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seriousness of the prosecutor's dereliction.lWFirst, when a prosecutor
knowingly uses perjured testimony, a court should apply a test that
would be most protective of a defendant's right to due proce~s.'~'
Second, when a prosecutor suppresses exculpatory evidence that has
been specifically requested by the defense, a court should apply a test
that would be somewhat less protective of a defendant's right to due
process than in the case of false te~timony.'~'
Third, when a prosecutor
suppresses exculpatory evidence that has not been specifically
requested by the defense, a court should apply a test that would
provide even less protection to a defendant's due process right.Ig3
The Court conceded that the tests are "inevitably impre~ise,"'~~
and observed, somewhat wistfully, that "the prudent prosecutor will
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure."1g5Nevertheless, the
Court emphasized, a prosecutor has no constitutional duty to disclose
any evidence unless the evidence that was suppressed reaches a
sufficiently high degree of prejudice to undermine the "justice of the
finding of guilt."'% Agurs repeated the ceremonial language routinely
used by the Court to describe a prosecutor's mission to serve justice:
"[A prosecutor] is the 'servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
Nonetheless, to the
that guilt shall not escape or innocence ~uffer.'"'~
extent that the Court applied the concept of "materiality"
prospectively and emboldened prosecutors not to provide "open file"
dis~overy,'~~
the decision, as a practical, matter tacitly encouraged
prosecutors to conceal favorable evidence and effectively insulated
prosecutors from accountability, even for gross and willful
misconduct.
Plainly, the Court's three tests of materiality were not only
190. Id. at 103-12.
191. Id. at 103 (stating a conviction must be reversed "if there is any reasonable
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury"). The
Court pointed out that such conduct involved "a corruption of the truth-seeking function
of the trial process." Id. at 104.
192. Id. at 104 ("A fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates that implicit in the
requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence might have affected
the outcome of the trial.").
193. See id, at 112 ("[Ilf the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not
otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed.").
194. Id. at 108 ("[Tlhe significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted
accurately until the entire record is complete . . . .").
195. Id.
196. Id. at 112-13.
197. Id. at 111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935)).
198. Id. at 109 ("If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only
way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete
discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.").
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imprecise, but were also speculative, backward-looking, and
confusing. If the verdict appeared to a reviewing court to be based on
sufficient evidence, the impact of a prosecutor's suppression of unused
and untested evidence would not only be difficult to evaluate
retrospectively, but in the context of a guilty verdict, most likely
viewed as not material. Moreover, implicit in Agurs was the
acknowledgement that a prosecutor had considerable leeway to
suppress substantially favorable evidence as long as the prosecutor
anticipated that the suppressed evidence, even if it were subsequently
discovered, would not impair the justice of prosecuting a clearly guilty
defendant for a clearly provable crime. Finally, by placing the burden
of establishing the constitutional violation on the defendant, the Court
reversed the well-settled rule that requires the beneficiary of a
constitutional error-e.,
the prosecutor-to
demonstrate the
harmlessness of his violation." By shifting the burden, the Court
afforded the prosecutor an added perverse incentive to conceal
evidence. 200
Whatever constitutional life remained in the so-called Brady rule
after Agurs was substantially eradicated nine years later in United
States v. ~ a ~ l ein~which
, ~ ~the
' Court established a new standard of
materiality that in practice rendered suppression of favorable
evidence by prosecutors a routine and rational act.z02Charged with
narcotics and firearms offenses, the defendant specifically requested
from the prosecutor any evidence of deals, promises, or inducements
made to government witnesses in exchange for their testimony.203
Although the government had paid two key witnesses for their
testimony, the prosecutor suppressed this information and the
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of
defendant was con~icted.'~
Appeals reversed the conviction finding that the prosecutor's failure
to respond to the specific request violated Brady; and, using a
harmless error analysis, determined that the error was not harmless
199. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring reversal unless a
prosecutor proves the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
200. See State v. Laurie, 653 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H. 1995) (holding the federal standard
"impose[s] too severe a burden" on criminal defendants, and that New Hampshire's
Constitution shifts to the prosecutor the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt
"that the undisclosed evidence would not have affected the verdict").
201. 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
202. See Sundby, supra note 3, at 644 (suggesting that under current Brady doctrine,
"an ethical prosecutor arguably should never be in the position of turning over Brady
material prior to trial" (emphasis omitted)).
203. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 669-70.
204. Id. at 670-71.
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beyond a reasonable doubt.205The Ninth Circuit also concluded that
the Brady violation impaired the defendant's right to confront the
government witnesses, requiring automatic reversal.'"
The Supreme Court reversed, but made two alterations to the
Brady rule. First, not surprisingly, the Court agreed that the Brady
rule encompassed both impeachment as well as exculpatory
e v i d e n ~ e .Of
~ far greater significance, however, was the Court's
reformulation of the Agurs standard of materiality used to determine
whether a conviction violates due process.208After reviewing the
Agurs framework, the Court suggested that the Agurs standard had
been reformulated in two prior cases-United States v. ValenzuelaBernalm and Strickland v. ~ a s h i n ~ t o n ~ ' ~ - a nthat
d the revised
standard was "sufficiently flexible" to cover every case of a
prosecutor's suppression of evidence, regardless of whether the
defense made a specific r e q ~ e s t . ~Under
"
the new standard of
materiality, "evidence is material only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."'12 A reasonable
probability, according to the Court, is "'a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.,,,213 Bagley, instead of
preserving a standard of materiality that reflected the strong moral
authority of Brady, adopted a standard that gave prosecutors far
greater discretion to suppress favorable evidence without violating
due process.
The Court applied this new formulation in three subsequent
decisions: Kyles v. ~ h i t l e y , ~Strickler
'~
v. Greene,'15and Banks v.
~ r e t k e . ~Kyles
' ~ and Banks reviewed capital murder convictions in
which prosecutors engaged in flagrant misconduct, including eliciting
false testimony, coaching witnesses to give false testimony, and
205. Id. at 673-74.
206. Id. at 674.
207. Id. at 676 ("This Court has rejected any such distinction between impeachment
evidence and exculpatory evidence.").
208. See id. at 682.
209. 458 U.S. 858,874 (1982).
210. 466 U.S. 668,694 (1984).
211. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681-83 (The government suggested that a materiality standard
more favorable to the defendant should be adopted in specific request cases, but the Court
rejected this suggestion).
212. Id. at 682.
213. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
214. 514 U.S. 419,421-22 (1995).
215. 527 U.S. 263,280 (1999).
216. 540 U.S. 668,703 (2004).
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suppressing important evidence that would have made a different
result "reasonably probable."217The Brady violations in Kyles and
Banks were so flagrant and inexcusable that reversal was required
even under the Court's new prosecutor-friendly standard of
material it^.^'^ Strickler, a capital murder conviction, also involved the
suppression of important evidence including several critical
documents that, as the Court noted, would have seriously undermined
the credibility of a key prosecution witness.219However, given the
ample other evidence of the defendant's guilt, there was no
"reasonable probability" of a different r e s ~ l t . ~
B. Subversion of Brady by Prosecutors
The following sections describe how prosecutors have
increasingly sought to avoid and subvert the requirements of Brady.
Prosecutors "play the odds" that their suppressions will not be
discovered or will be found not material, engage in tactics that thwart
the ability of courts and defense counsel to discover Brady violations,
and affirmatively conceal Brady violations by carefully coaching the
testimony of witnesses.
1. "Playing the Odds"

Predictably, prosecutors under the current standard of materiality
are permitted "to withhold with impunity large amounts of undeniably
favorable evidence" in the rational belief that an appellate court
reviewing the conviction will conclude that there is no "reasonable
probability" that the evidence would have changed the result.221
To be
sure, this rnindset exists not only with prosecutors who are trying to
"outwit and entrap [their] quarry,"222but also by ethical prosecutors
who attempt to balance their obligation to seek a conviction and at
217. Banks, 540 U.S. at 675-76 ("When police or prosecutors conceal significant
exculpatory or impeaching material in the State's possession, it is ordinarily incumbent on
the State to set the record straight."); Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421,441,454 ("'[F]airness' cannot
be stretched to the point of calling this a fair trial.").
218. Banks, 540 U.S. at 675-76; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 454. Indeed, from the evidence in
the record, it is strongly arguable that both Kyles and Banks were innocent. See supra note
18 for cases of wrongful convictions in which the prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory
evidence contributed substantially to the conviction.
219. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 265,282. See infro notes 226-27 and accompanying text for a
discussion of prosecutors suppression of evidence which would have seriously undermined
the credibility of a key prosecution witness.
220. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296.
221. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,700 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
222. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring).
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the same time fulfill their constitutional obligation under ~ r a d ~ . ~ ~ ~
Needless to say, such a prosecutorial mindset corrupts the truthfinding process and is antithetical to core values in the administration
of justice that command prosecutors to serve justice and treat
defendants fairly.224
The dissenters in Bagley predicted that under the new standard,
prosecutors deciding whether or not to disclose favorable evidence to
the defense would increasingly "play the odds" that their suppression
of evidence, even if discovered, would be found by an appellate court
reviewing the conviction to be not material.225
This prediction has been
borne out in countless cases where prosecutors have suppressed
important items of evidence and courts have permitted this conduct.
Thus, prosecutors will likely play the odds when they possess
exculpatory evidence that might be valuable to the defenseconfident that the evidence of guilt will be viewed retrospectively by
an appellate court to be sufficiently substantial so that the
prosecutor's suppression does not create a "reasonable probability"
that the verdict would be different. A good example is Strickler v.
Greene,226
a capital murder trial in which a key prosecution eyewitness,
Anne Stoltzfus, initially told the police that she had only "muddled
memoriesyyabout a kidnapping in a mall and could not identify the
At trial, however,
perpetrators, the victim, or the a~tomobile.~~'

223. Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor's Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL.
550,554,559,565 (1987) (articulating that prosecutor's "naturally assume[] that defendants
are guilty," and it therefore "becomes easy for the prosecutor to overlook and ignore
evidence that does not fit his conception of the proper outcome").
224. See Stanley Z . Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual
Framework, 15 AM. J . CRIM. L. 197, 198 (1988). Ethical codes uniformly recognize a
prosecutor's role as a "minister[] of justice." Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2004) (describing the prosecutor as a "minister of justice");
E C 7-13 (2004) (stating that a prosecutor must
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY
"seek justice"); A B A STANDARDSRELATINGTO THE ADMIN. OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 31.2(c) (1992), reprinted in PROFESSIONALRESPONSIBILITY STANDARDS, RULES &
REGULATIONS1135 (John S. Dzienkowski ed., West Group 2001) ("The duty of the
prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict.").
225. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 701 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe standard invites a
prosecutor, whose interests are conflicting, to gamble, to play the odds, and to take a
chance that evidence will later turn out not to have been potentially dispositive.").
226. 527 U.S. 263 (1999).
227. Id. at 265,273-74. Stoltzfus first spoke to the police two weeks after the crime. Id.
at 273. She told Detective Claytor that she could not identify the black female victim, nor
the two white male perpetrators, but could identify the white female perpetrator. Id.
Stolzfus told Detective Claytor that "I have a very vague memory that I'm not sure of,"
and that "I totally wrote this off as a trivial episode of college kids carrying on and
proceeded with my own full-time college load. . . ." Id. at 274-75.
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Stoltzfus gave astonishingly detailed testimony about the event.228She
gave a detailed description of all three perpetrator^,"^ the victim,230
and even remembered the license plate number of the van.231Denying
suggestions that she had learned these details from news reports,
Stoltzfus answered, "I have an exceptionally good memory."232
The process by which Stoltzfus' memory improved so remarkably
was revealed in a series of documents prepared by the lead detective
in the case, Detective Claytor, which were never disclosed to the
defense.u3 These documents were based on interviews between
Detective Claytor and Stolztfus in which her memory continued to
expand over time because, she claimed, of "the associations that
[Detective Claytor] helped [her] make."'"
The Supreme Court concluded that, although the prosecutor
suppressed several items of favorable evidence that would have
severely impeached Stoltzfus, there was other ample evidence of
Strickler's involvement.235 Therefore, the petitioner failed to
228. Id. at 270-74. She testified about seeing the perpetrators in a music store,
described their appearance and behavior in detail, thought they looked "rewed up" and
"very impatient," remembered bumping into one of them, and "thought she felt something
hard in the pocket of his coat." Id. at 270-71. She left the store, but again encountered the
threesome, one of whom bumped into Stoltzfus and asked directions to the bus stop. Id. at
271. Stoltzfus followed them and later saw the man "tearing out of the Mall entrance." Id.
She saw the victim blowing her horn a long time, and the petitioner "started hitting her on
the head"; Stolzfus became upset. Id. at 272. Stolzfus stated that "[tlhe driver looked
'frozen' and mouthed an inaudible response." Id. Next, "Stolzfus started t o drive away and
realized 'the only word that it could possibly be, was help."' Id.
229. Id. at 270 n.5. Stolzfus testified that Strickler:
[Wlore a grey T-shirt with a Harley Davidson insignia on it.. . . [Co-defendant]
Henderson "had either a white or light colored shirt, probably a short sleeve knit
shirt and his pants were neat. They weren't just old blue jeans. They may have
been new blue jeans or it may have just been more dressy slacks of some sort."
The woman "had blonde hair, it was kind of in a shaggy cut down the back. She
had blue eyes, she had a real sweet smile, kind of a small mouth. Just a touch of
freckles on her face."
Id. (citations omitted).
230. Id. at 271. She testified that this woman was "'beautiful,' 'well dressed and she
was happy, she was singing. . . ."' Id. (alteration in original).
231. Id, at 272 n.7.
232. Id. at 272. Stolzfus testified that she had very close contact with the petitioner and
"he made an emotional impression with me because of his behavior and I, he caught my
attention and I paid attention." Id. at 272-73.
233. Id. at 273-75,282. Of the eight documents either prepared by Claytor o r received
by him from Stolzfus, it is undisputed that at least five of those documents "were known to
the Commonwealth but not disclosed to trial counsel." Id. at 282. The prosecutor claimed
that three of these documents were in his open file, but defense counsel maintained
otherwise. Id. at 275 n.11.
234. Id. at 274.
235. Id. at 290.
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demonstrate a "reasonable probability that his conviction or sentence
would have been different had [the Stoltzfus] materials been
d i s ~ l o s e d . "Justice
~~
Souter, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented,
arguing that "the likely havoc that an informed cross-examiner could
have wreaked upon Stoltzfus" would have been "sufficient to
undermine confidence that the death recommendation would have
been the
Prosecutors also "play the odds" when they suppress favorable
evidence in the rational belief that an appellate court will find the
evidence to be "cumulative" of other evidence already presented. A
~~
case, in which the
good example is Barker v. ~ l e r n i n ~ a, ' robbery
prosecutor suppressed several items of evidence that, as the appellate
court acknowledged, would have substantially discredited a key
prosecution witness Raul Abundiz, a "jailhouse snitch," who testified
that the defendant confessed to him that he committed the robbery.I3'
The court appeared to go out of its way to minimize the materiality of
the suppressed evidence, finding that "the cumulative impeachment
evidence is unlikely to have been the difference between conviction
and a ~ q u i t t a l . " ~ ~
In concluding that the suppressed evidence was not material, the
court failed to accord sufficient weight to several key factors. First,
this was the second trial; the first ended in a hung jury based on the
victim's equivocal identification and the absence of any other
corroborating evidence.241Second, the court acknowledged that the
suppressed evidence would not only have "highlighted Abundiz's
dishonest nature,"242but also have prevented the defense from
demonstrating that the alleged conversation between Abundiz and the
236. Id. at 296.
237. Id. at 304 (Souter, J., dissenting).
238. 423 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2005). The case attracted considerable media attention
and came to be known as the "clown robber" case because the perpetrator wore makeup.
Id. at 1089.
239. Id. at 1090.
240. Id. at 1100; see also John B. Mitchell, Evaluating Brady Error Using Narrative
Theory: A Proposal for Reform, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 599, 621-27 (2005) (critically
evaluating the evidence at the first trial from the standpoint of how defense counsel could
have made effective use of the suppressed evidence).
241. Barker, 423 F.3d at 1089-90. Indeed, the court found the victim's identification at
the second trial t o be extremely flawed. Id. at 1100. The court acknowledged that her
identification was "not airtight[,] [hler view was obstructed by the robber's makeup and, at
times, by a handkerchief." Id. Her description to the police "became more precise after she
talked with co-workers who knew and already distrusted [the defendant]." Id. Likewise,
"she did not see any of his tattoos," yet stated "that his hands were covered with markings
and makeup." Id.
242. Id. at 1096.
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defendant in which the defendant supposedly confessed never in fact
could have occurred.243Although acknowledging that the suppressed
impeachment evidence casting doubt on whether Barker could have
confessed to Abundiz "is qualitatively different than the evidence
i n t r ~ d u c e d , "the
~ ~ court, nonetheless, concluded that, although the
suppressed evidence prevented the defense from "telling this tale," it
would merely invite the jury to speculate.245The court ultimately
concluded that although the victim's identification was weak and
although the new corroborating witness's "proclivity for lying had
already been firmly established,"246"we remain confident in the
verdict despite the potential damage the withheld evidence would
have

2. Sandbagging Tactics
In addition to "playing the odds," prosecutors have engaged in
various tactics that are intended to subvert the Brady rule. One of the
most insidious tactics used by prosecutors is orchestrating a scheme
whereby a prosecution witness testifies that he has made no deal with
the prosecutor concerning his testimony. However, unbeknownst to
the judge or jury, the prosecutor has in fact entered into an agreement
with the witness's attorney to reward the witness for his testimony and
extracted a promise from the witness's attorney that he would not tell
his client about the agreement. The witness, therefore, would be able
to testify that there was no deal in place without perjuring himself
because he would not personally be informed of the arrangement.
For example, in Hayes v. Brown, the prosecutor reached an
agreement with the attorney for a key witness in a murder case to give
that witness transactional immunity and dismiss other pending charges
in exchange for his testimony.248However, seeking to keep the
promise away from the judge and jury, the prosecutor obtained a
promise from the witness's attorney that he would not tell his client
about the deal; and, in that way, the witness could honestly testify
243. Id. at 1095 ("[Ilt takes little imagination to see how a competent attorney could
have implied that such a deal [between Abundiz and the prosecution to testify against
Barkerj existed. It takes even less imagination to see how evidence calling into question
whether Barker and Abundiz talked on June 14 would have helped Barker impeach
Abundiz.").
244. Id. at 1097.
245. Id. at 1099.
246. Id. at 1096.
247. Id. at 1100.
248. 399 F.3d 972,977 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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without perjuring himself because he would not be personally
informed of the
In response to defense counsel's inquiry
whether there has been any negotiated settlement in return for the
witness's testimony, the prosecutor responded in open court that
"[tlhere has been absolutely no negotiations whatsoever in regard to
his testimony," and that there were "absolutely no promises and no
discussions in regard to any pending charges."250
The prosecutor took the position on appeal that there was no due
process violation because the witness did not commit perjury."' The
Ninth Court of Appeals scathingly rejected this argument: "It is
reprehensible for the State to seek refuge in the claim that a witness
did not commit perjury, when the witness unknowingly presents false
testimony at the behest of the
Citing the line of Supreme
Court decisions involving the prosecutor's presentation of false
testimony or the failure to correct false testimony, the court roundly
condemned the prosecutor's scheme as "covert subornation of
perjury."253
Some prosecutors seek to insulate their witnesses from attacks on
their credibility through other nefarious schemes intended to subvert
the Brady rule. In Silva v. Brown, for example, the prosecutor made a
secret deal with the attorney for a key witness to forgo having the
witness psychiatrically evaluated prior to his testimony.254 The
attorney for the witness, an accomplice in a murder who had suffered
severe brain damage years earlier, had planned to have his client
psychiatrically evaluated after his arraignment because he was either
unable to cooperate in his defense or was insane.25sBecause the
psychiatric evaluation would "'supply ammunition to the defense,"'
the prosecutor struck a bargain with the witness's lawyer under which
his client would not be examined and in return, the prosecutor would
249. Id.
250. Id. at 979-80.
251. Id. at 980.
252. Id. at 981.
253. Id. at 978, 981. A s the court observed: "The fact that the witness is not complicit
in the falsehood is what gives the false testimony the ring of truth, and makes it all the
more likely to affect the judgment of the jury." Id. at 981. For other cases involving this
scheme, see Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 252 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that due
process is violated when there is a reasonable probability that if the inducement had been
offered by the prosecutor to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different)
and People v. Steadman, 623 N.E.2d 509,510,512 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a prosecutor's
failure to disclose an agreement in exchange for testimony which was not a harmless error
results in a new trial).
254. 416 F.3d 980,984 (9th Cir. 2005).
255. Id.
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dismiss the murder charges in exchange for his te~timony."~
The appellate court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding
that the prosecutor's "unscrupulous decision to keep secret the deal
he made to prevent an evaluation of the competence of the State's
star witness" was material impeachment evidence under Brady.'"
Knowing that the prosecutor made a deal to foreclose the witness's
psychiatric evaluation would have had a powerful impact on the jury's
assessment of the witness's testimony. Indeed, "the very fact that the
[prosecutor] had sought to keep evidence of [the witness's] mental
capacity away from the jury might have diminished the State's own
credibility as a presenter of evidence."258

3. Coaching Testimony
Some prosecutors are motivated to engage in improper coaching
of witnesses in order to prevent the revelation of materially favorable
evidence that the prosecutor has withheld from the defense. Improper
coaching, the "dark secret[]" of the U.S. adversary system? is
typically used by lawyers in preparing witnesses for trial in order to
eliminate discrepancies in testimony and avoid embarrassing details.
But coaching is also used by prosecutors to insulate Brady violations
from being discovered. Plainly, a prosecutor, who is willing to violate
his constitutional and ethical duty to disclose favorable evidence, is
also willing to shape his witnesses' testimony to conceal the violation.
Indeed, in the two most recent decisions in which the Supreme Court
vacated convictions based on the prosecutor's suppression of
exculpatory evidence,260the implication of witness-coaching was
transparent.
A good example of coaching a witness to hide the existence of
suppressed evidence is Walker v. City of New York, in which the
prosecutor almost certainly coached a cooperating witness to give
256. Id.
257. Id. at 991. The court also noted, "When prosecutors betray their solemn
obligations and abuse the immense power they hold, the fairness of our entire system of
justice is called into doubt and public confidence in it is undermined." Id.
258. Id. at 988.
259. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 279 (1989)
("Witness preparation is treated as one of the dark secrets of the legal profession.").
260. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 677, 685, 705 (2004) (stating the suppressed
transcript of pretrial practice sessions shows how the prosecutor "intensively coached" and
"closely rehearsed" the testimony of witnesses); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,443 & n.14,
454 (1995) (finding a clear implication of witness coaching from suppressed evidence as
well as fact that testimony at subsequent a trial was much more precise than at an earlier
trial).
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false testimony in order to conceal from the defense information that
In Walker, the
would have undermined the witness's ~redibilit~.'~'
prosecutor debriefed and prepared for trial a cooperating witness in
an investigation of the robbery of an armored truck and murder of the
truck driver.262At the initial proffer session, the witness identified two
individuals as having participated in the crime.263The prosecutor
subsequently learned, however, that one of these alleged accomplices
could not have committed the crime because he was in prison on the
date of the robbery.2MNevertheless, the prosecutor elicited testimony
from the cooperator before the grand jury and at trial where he did
not mention a second accomplice.265Although the decision by the
Court of Appeals condemned the prosecutor's failure to disclose the
stark inconsistency in the witness's story, the court did not discuss the
witness's failure to mention the existence of a second perpetrator.266
However, the implication of coaching by the prosecutor is obvious.
C. Marginalizing of Brady by Disciplinary Bodies

Making prosecutors accountable for violations of Brady has not
been a success.267To be sure, bar associations and grievance
committees have the power to discipline prosecutors for violations of
ethical rules.268However, most commentators agree that professional
discipline of prosecutors is extremely rare.269 The absence of
--

-

--

-

261. 974 F.2d 293,295,301 (2d Cir. 1992).
262. Id. at 294-95.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 295.
265. Id.
266. See id. at 294,301.
267. Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability for suppressing
exculpatory evidence. E.g., Lyles v. Sparks, 79 F.3d 372, 377 (4th Cir. 1996); Carter v.
Burch, 34 F.3d 257,263 (4th Cir. 1994).
268. See, e.g., Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO.J . LEGAL ETHICS1083, 108889 (1994).
269. See DWYER ET AL., supra note 18, at 175 (stating that even when cases are
reversed because of a prosecutor's misconduct, "nothing happens to the people who broke
their oaths and the law in pursuit of a conviction"); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics
as Usual, 2003 U . ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1596 (2003) (noting that existing rules of ethics fail to
regulate large areas of prosecutors' professional conduct); Rosen, supra note 27, at 697-98
(discussing the absence of ethical remedies against prosecutors); Joseph R. Weeks, No
Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA.
C I n U. L. REV. 833, 898 (1997) (concluding
that disciplinary processes are almost completely ineffective against prosecutors);
Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 288 (arguing that prosecutors who intentionally suppress
evidence "are rarely, if ever, disciplined"); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline
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significant discipline of prosecutors is particularly noteworthy in cases
in which prosecutors intentionally suppress evidence that leads to a
reversal of a defendant's conviction and a stinging rebuke by a court
of the prosecutor's misconduct. Although one would realistically
expect disciplinary agencies to proceed aggressively against such
unscrupulous conduct, such is not the case. Moreover, of all the
ethical rules relating to the conduct of a prosecutor, the ethical rule
governing a prosecutor's suppression of evidence is the most explicit
and easiest to enforce.270
However, even when faced with this "most
dangerous misconduct," disciplinary bodies typically look the other
way.n'
There are a variety of reasons for the hands-off approach: the
existence of internal controls by prosecutor's offices, the ability of
courts to supervise prosecutorial excesses, the deference by bar
associations to executive power, limited resources, and lack of
expertise in criminal procedural issues.272
Although there may be some
basis to credit each of these reasons, they do not explain the stark
disparity between the numerous and often egregious violations by
prosecutors, and the infrequency of discipline.
of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 755, 778 (2001) (stating that "prosecutors are
disciplined rarely," but "the traditional lamentations regarding the absence of bar
discipline are somewhat overblown, but also contain a large measure of truth"). On the
effectiveness of discipline by the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility, see DAVIDBURNHAM,ABOVETHE LAW: SECRET DEALS. POLITICAL
FIXES AND OTHER MISADVENTURESOF THE U.S. DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE 331
(Scribner 1996) ("The systemic failure of this tiny, extremely passive unit to confront
directly the misconduct of Justice Department officials must be considered one of the most
serious lapses in the department's recent history."); see also United States v. Hasting, 461
U.S. 499, 522 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Prior
experience, for example, might have demonstrated the futility of relying on Department of
Justice disciplinary proceedings."); Greg Rushford, Watching the Watchdog: Veteran Justice
Department Ethics Oficer Faces Questions About His Own Actions, LEGALTIMES, Feb. 5,
1990, at 1 (criticizing the effectiveness of the Office of Professional Responsibility).
Occasionally an offending prosecutor is punished by disciplinary bodies. See In re Peasley,
90 P.3d 764, 766-67, 781 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (discussing a county prosecutor disbarred
for deliberately presenting a witness's false testimony in two death penalty trials); Jeffrey
Toobin, Killer Instincts: Did a Famous Prosecutor Put the Wrong Man on Death Row, THE
NEW YORKER, Jan. 17,2005, at 54 (discussing Mr. Peasley's conduct and disbarment).
270. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
271. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 288 ("Despite this well documented and all too
recurrent violation of professional responsibility, prosecutors who engage in such tactics
are rarely, if ever, disciplined."); Armstrong & Possley, supra note 8, at 13. After studying
381 murder convictions which were reversed because of prosecutorial suppression of
evidence or subornation of perjury, authors found that not one of the prosecutors who
broke the law in these most serious charges were ever convicted or disbarred and most of
the time they were not even disciplined. Id.
272. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 289-96.
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For example, commentators have examined numerous instances
of deliberate suppression of evidence by prosecutors discussed in
many of these cases cited in this article.273These studies have included
statistical surveys and interviews with personnel in bar grievance
agencies. As virtually every writer has concluded, few if any of these
prosecutors have been disciplined, and indeed, very few prosecutors
have even been investigated by disciplinary bodies. In fact, some of
these disciplinary offices have reported that they are not aware of any
proceeding ever being instituted against a prosecutor for suppression
of evidence, notwithstanding the existence of appellate decisions
criticizing prosecutors for their misconduct.274
Of the many instances of egregious misconduct by prosecutors in
suppressing exculpatory evidence, the most disturbing examples are
those cases involving defendants who were falsely accused and
convicted and later exonerated.275One would naturally expect that a
prosecutor who abetted the conviction of an innocent person by
suppressing exculpatory evidence would be a prime candidate for
severe disciplinary action. Such is not the case, as too many examples
prove. For example, there is absolutely no question that the
prosecutor in People v. Ramos deliberately withheld exculpatory
evidence from the defense that resulted in the wrongful conviction
The appellate
and imprisonment for seven years of an innocent man.276
court reversed the defendant's conviction for numerous Brady
violations, and excoriated the prosecutor for her misconduct.277The
disciplinary committee conducted an investigation after the reversal
by the appellate court and closed its investigation without imposing
discipline.278
Interestingly, during the discovery process in a civil rights
action brought against the city, it was revealed that the same District
Attorney's office had been cited seventy-two times from 1975-1996
273. See sources cited supra note 269; see also Weinberg, supra note 10; Yaroshefsky,
supra note 16,281-82.
274. See Weeks, supra note 269, at 881 (noting several cases of prosecutorial
misconduct in which disciplinary action was not even considered).
275. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (collecting cases and suggesting these
cases are merely a tiny fraction of the total number).
276. People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977,980 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
277. Id. at 984. The suppressed evidence included proof that the child's sexually
provocative behavior explained the evidence relied o n by the prosecution to suggest the
child was abused; statements from the victim exonerating the defendant or inconsistent
with his guilt; and statements from several prosecution witnesses that would have severely
discredited their testimony. Id. at 980-83. In addition, the prosecutor elicited testimony at
trial that was calculated to reinforce the false or inconsistent testimony of her witnesses. Id.
at 980-81.
278. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 16, at 28&82.
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for misconduct, including the reversal of eighteen cases for
suppressing exculpatory evidence.279
IV. CODIFYINGBRADY
Criminal discovery allows a defendant to acquire relevant
information about the prosecution's case, thereby enhancing the
truth-finding process and minimizing the danger that an innocent
defendant will be wrongfully convicted. Given the prosecutor's
domination of the criminal justice system, the prosecutor controls
access to information relevant to a defendant's guilt and has the
ability to withhold information that might prove a defendant's
innocence.280However, the defendant's ability to acquire relevant
information under current discovery rules is extremely limited and,
indeed, may resemble a game of "blindman's buff
And
compounding the restrictiveness of pretrial discovery rules in general
is the defendant's inability to obtain exculpatory information due to
the prosecutor's ability to manipulate and abuse the disclosure
requirements under Brady and its p r ~ g e n y . ~As
' one reflects on the
development of the law of prosecutorial disclosure since Brady v.
Maryland, it is increasingly obvious that there exists a close nexus
between a defendant's limited discovery in criminal cases and the
enhanced opportunities for prosecutorial suppression of evidence.
Because the power to control evidence is the power to conceal it,
broadening the discovery rules in criminal cases might insure greater
compliance by prosecutors with their disclosure obligations under
Brady v. Maryland.
279. Id. at 281-82.
280. See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINALPROCEDURE1205 (9th ed.
1999) (describing the prosecutor's domination of the criminal justice system, including
investigative manpower of police, investigative legal authority of grand jury and grand
jury's subpoena power, early on scene arrival by police when evidence is fresh, and the
natural inclination of witnesses to cooperate with police and refuse to cooperate with the
defense).
281. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677,682 (1958). It is ironic that
civil litigation, where only money is involved, provides extensive pretrial discovery
requirements for the parties, whereas in criminal litigation, where a defendant's liberty and
even life are at issue, pretrial discovery is so restrictive. The argument for restricting
discovery in criminal cases has been that a defendant armed with such information will
take steps to bribe, frighten, or harm witnesses. See State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (N.J.
1953).
282. See Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 309, 327 (2001) ("To the extent that a prosecutor has exclusive knowledge and
control of such evidence, the prosecutor can obstruct the defendant's access to it and
thereby impede the discovery of the truth.").
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Discovery rules, in contrast to the ethics codes, do not define the
nature and scope of a prosecutor's disclosure duty under Brady. For
example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, which governs
discovery in criminal cases, contains modest requirements of
prosecutorial disclosure, but does not require a prosecutor to divulge
significant kinds of favorable information that might enhance a
defendant's ability to prepare and present his case.283Whereas most
local court rules of criminal procedure do not impose obligations on
prosecutors to comply with Brady, there have been a few exceptions.
For example, as a result of pervasive violations of Brady by federal
prosecutors in Massachusetts, the federal courts adopted Local Rule
116.2 to ensure that prosecutors complied with Brady's disclosure
requirements.% The local rule requires prosecutors to disclose, under
a limited time frame, any information that could "cast doubt" on the
defendant's guilt, the admissibility and credibility of evidence, and the
degree of the defendant's culpability under the federal guideline^.^^
The local rule also requires the prosecutor to inform all law
enforcement agencies participating in the investigation of the local
rule's discovery requirements, and to obtain any information subject
to
The Massachusetts Local Rule 1.3 further imposes
sanctions for noncompliance, including
Other federal courts have imposed similar disclosure
requirements on prosecutors that exceed the due process requirement
of Brady. Recognizing that Brady's materiality standard is virtually
impossible to discern before trial,2B8these courts have reasoned that
283. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. Under Rule 16, a prosecutor is required to disclose
statements by the defendant, the defendant's prior criminal record, inspection and copying
of documents and tangible items, and summaries of expert testimony. Id. Not required to
be disclosed are identities of witnesses, statements by witnesses, rewards or other
incentives to witnesses, information relating t o bias, prejudice, mental competency,
criminal records of witnesses, inconsistent or contradictory examinations or scientific tests,
or the failure of a witness to make a positive identification of the defendant. Id.
284. See United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 59, 71 (D. Mass. 1994) (finding
that prosecutors had consistently, for many years, shown an "obdurate indifference t o . . .
disclosure responsibilities," and had engaged in "sloppy," "negligen[t]," "lame," and
"insensitiv[e]" conduct); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a) (providing authority for district
courts to adopt rules governing pretrial procedure as long as local rule does not conflict
with federal law).
285. See Am. Coll. of Trial Lawyers, Proposed Codification of Disclosure of Favorable
Information Under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure I1 and 16,41 AM. CRIM.L. REV.
93, 104-06 (2003) [hereinafter Proposed Codification] (describing the background for
enactment of Massachusetts Local Rule 116.2 and its provisions).
286. Id. at 106.
287. Id.
288. United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (C.D. Cal. 1999); see also
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"just because a prosecutor's failure to disclose evidence does not
violate a defendant's due process rights does not mean that the failure
to disclose is proper."289Thus, in United States v. Acosta, the federal
district court ordered prosecutors "to timely disclose before trial all
evidence or information known that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigate the offenses charged."'% This standard is similar to
the ethical standard in that it requires timely pretrial disclosure
without regard to the materiality of the e~idence.'~'
In light of the development of local rules imposing automatic
discovery obligations on prosecutors, it has been suggested that
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 be amended to incorporate
these changes and make them applicable to all federal prosecutor^.'^
The proposal would require that within fourteen days of a defendant's
request, the prosecutor must disclose all favorable evidence known to
him or any law enforcement officer who participated in the
investigation or prosecution of the events underlying the crimes
charged.293Favorable evidence includes "all information in any form,
whether or not admissible, that tends to: a) exculpate the defendant;
b) adversely impact the credibility of government witnesses or
evidence; c) mitigate the offense; or d) mitigate punishment."294

Reflecting on the evolution of Brady v. Maryland, one is struck
by the stark dissonance between the grand expectations of Brady, that
the adversary system henceforth would be transformed from a
"sporting contest" to a genuine search for truth, and the grim reality
that criminal litigation continues to operate as a "trial by ambush."
The development of the Brady rule by the judiciary depicts a gradual
United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Nev. 2005) (recognizing that the
"cumulative 'materiality' standard [is] extremely difficult if not impossible to discern
before trial").
289. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 1239; see also Sudikoff, 36 F . Supp. 2d at 1199 (noting
that absence of prejudice t o a defendant does not condone a prosecutor's suppression).
290. Acosta, 357 F . Supp. 2d at 1231. The district court noted that "'favorable'
evidence and the 'negate or mitigate' standards are essentially identical." Id. at 1234.
291. Id. at 1233. The district court addressed the potential conflict between the pretrial
disclosure requirement and the Jencks Act, which requires the government to produce
statements of witnesses only after they have testified at trial. Id. at 1234-36. In the event of
a conflict, the government may either produce the evidence or seek a protective order
from the court. Id. at 1236.
292. See Proposed Codification, supra note 284, at 95.
293. Id. at 111.
294. Id.

Heinonline - - 47 S. Tex. L. Rev. 727 2005-2006

728

SOUTH TEXASLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 47:685

erosion of Brady: from a prospective obligation on prosecutors to
make timely disclosure, to the defense of materially favorable
evidence, to a retrospective review by an appellate court into whether
the prosecutor's suppression was unduly prejudicial. The erosion of
Brady has been accompanied by increasing prosecutorial
gamesmanship in gambling that violations will not be discovered or, if
discovered, will be allowed, and tactics that abet and hide violations.
Finally, the absence of any legal or ethical sanctions to make
prosecutors accountable for violations produces a system marked by
willful abuse of law, cynicism, and the real possibility that innocent
persons may be wrongfully convicted because of the prosecutor's
misconduct. Indeed, more than any other rule of criminal procedure,
the Brady rule has been the most fertile and widespread source of
misconduct by prosecutors; and, more than any other rule of
constitutional criminal procedure, has exposed the deficiencies in the
truth-serving function of the criminal trial.
One proposal that might improve the truth-finding process by
reducing the incidence of Brady violations is to expand the discovery
rules to require prosecutors to make timely disclosures to the defense
of favorable information known to them or other law enforcement
officials. Whereas Brady has been transposed into an explicit ethical
requirement in the professional responsibility codes, there has been
no parallel development in the procedural discovery codes. In
response to flagrant misconduct by prosecutors, however, some courts
have imposed strict pretrial disclosure requirements on prosecutors,
and local court rules have been enacted to codify such requirements.
Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to impose strict
and explicit disclosure requirements on prosecutors might be one way
to restore the promise of Brady v. Maryland.
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